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FEDERALISM, STATE COURTS, AND SECTION 1983

Gene R. Nichol, Jr.*
HE law of federal courts is hardly a model of clarity. The body
of judicial decisions catalogued roughly under the case or controversy requirement embraces principles that are both elusive and
inconsistently applied. 1 The features that distinguish the powers of
article III and article I judges are notoriously unfathomable. 2 The
"arising under" jurisdiction defies definition. 3 The content of the
eleventh amendment limitation of judicial authority cannot be ascertained by either logic or examination of the constitutional text;'
And the power of the Congress to manipulate the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court remains both controverted11 and, to our good fortune, largely untested. 6

T

* James Gould Cutler Professor of Constitutional Law, Institute of Bill of Rights Law,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. Martin Redish, Mike Wells, and Paul LeBel provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this essay. Drew Dolson supplied much-needed research assistance.
1
See generally Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 68 (1984) (arguing that the
"injury" analysis of standing has not resulted in inconsistency of application).
• See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 105 (1982);
see also National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 584-600 (1949)
(surveying allocation of powers and jurisdiction conferred by articles I and Ill).
3
See generally Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 812 (1982) (discussing "arising under" jurisdiction); H. Fink & M. Tushnet, Federal Jurisdiction: Policy and Practice 470 (1984) (same).
• See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149-56 (1908) (attempting to determine
scope of eleventh amendment); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1889) (same).
• See generally M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial
Power 7-34 (1980) (discussing the authority of Congress to control the jurisdiction of article
III courts).
• But see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (statute withdrawing appellate
jurisdiction of United States Supreme Court upheld).
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The principles that regulate the relationship between the state
and federal courts, however, easily rank among the most byzantine
of the entire federal courts jurisprudence. The operation of two autonomous judicial systems within the same geographical boundary
is a matter of no small complexity. The supremacy clause, of
course, assures a fundamental primacy to federal tribunals. To
mitigate federal intrusion, however, the Supreme Court has fashioned a bevy of related jurisdictional doctrines that channel exercises of the national judicial power. This complex patchworkrequiring, under various circumstances, abstention, exhaustion,
equitable restraint, and the like7 -has substantially complicated
the federal litigation process.
No doubt much of this effort, and perhaps even much of the
resulting confusion, is unavoidable. In a dual court system, it is not
only essential that principles be set forth allocating the powers to
be exercised by the constituent judiciaries, but that standards be
developed to determine how each tribunal will deal with the other.
These, in any circumstances, are not simple tasks.8
The problems arising from this natural tension, however, have
been further complicated by the nature of the evolving relationship
between the state and federal judicial systems. During the first
century of our history, state courts enjoyed, at least relatively
speaking, a substantial autonomy from their federal counterparts.9
After the Civil War, however, a program of federal oversight gradually began to take shape. The provisions of the Civil War amendments promised a significant revision in concepts of state sovereignty. The magnitude of that alteration, however, has provided
the focus of our most pervasive, and most tenacious, constitutional
7
Consider, for example, Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (abstention); Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (abstention); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971) (doctrine of equitable restraint); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (limited exhaustion requirement); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (limiting habeas corpus
review).
8
Consider, for example, de Tocqueville's statement:
As the Constitution of the U.S. recognized two distinct sovereignties, in presence of
each other, represented in a judicial point of view by two distinct classes of courts of
justice, the utmost care taken in defining their separate jurisdictions would have been
insufficient to prevent frequent collisions between those tribunals.
1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 147 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
9
I speak here, of course, of supervision by federal trial courts. Since at least the time of
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), state courts have been supervised
by the United States Supreme Court.
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debate. Substantively, the federalism controversy has played itself
out vividly in the interpretation of the clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. Procedurally, the debate has been vigorous as well.
But surprisingly, the battle has centered on an exercise in statutory interpretation. 10 The modern interplay between state and federal courts has been intricately tied to the meaning, scope, and
content of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.11 This essay will consider a particularly troubling subset of the law of federal-state judicial interaction: the relationship between the section 1983 cause of action and
state judicial process.
Section 1983 creates a cause of action for the deprivation of "any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States. "~ 2 When the abrogation of civil liberties
is alleged to have occurred by means of state judicial process, however, particularly thorny problems arise. The statute, by its terms,
applies broadly to all state actors. But local tribunals have traditionally enjoyed a variety of shields from national interference.
The Supreme Court's treatment of the dilemma has been less than
satisfying. Consider the most prominent examples.
Applying an essentially historical model in Mitchum v. Foster/ 3
the high court ruled that the framers of section 1983 intended the
cause of action to extend to injunctive claims directed at pending
state judicial process. 14 Apparently ignoring that historical argnment in Younger v. Harris/ 5 the Justices announced a doctrine of
equitable restraint that all but forecloses injunctive interference
with state cases. 16 The Court has u~:;ed the legislative intent of section 1983 to recognize, despite the language of the statute, an absolute immunity from damage claims for local judicial officers. 17
10
The Younger doctrine appears to be strictly an example of judge-made law, as opposed
to statutory interpretation. I argue below, however, that Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225
(1972), casts doubt on such a vision of Younger. Accordingly, the decision must be seen as
an interpretation of§ 1983. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
11
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See infra text accompanying note 77 for text of the statute.
.. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982).
13 407 u.s. 225 (1972).
1
• See id. at 242.
15
401 u.s. 37 (1971).
" See id. at 43-44.
17
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967). See generally Rosenberg, Stump v.
Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Impunity, 64 Va. L. Rev. 833 (1978) (discussing the
Supreme Court's reaffirmance of the judicial immunity doctrine).
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Recently, however, the Court ruled that the "intention" of section
1983 did not foreclose the issuance of prospective federal relief
against state judges. 18 The "history" of section 1983, reflecting a
substantial distrust of local judicial process, has been employed to
relieve a plaintiff of the burden of exhausting state judicial remedies prior to seeking federal redress. 19 The doctrine of collateral
estoppel, however, has been held fully applicable to section 1983
claims, as the result of a refusal by the Court to embrace the same
historical premise. 20 In short, the Supreme Court has addressed
the relationship between section 1983 and state courts desired by
the statute's framers in a variety of contexts and by means of a
number of supposedly distinct inquiries. With apparent equal facility, the Justices have concluded that the section 1983 cause of
action does, and does not, incorporate a heavy dose of deference to
state judiciaries. The final judicial product, therefore, is a course
that is massively difficult to navigate. The propriety of the Court's
handiwork will be the focus of the discussion that follows.
First, I consider in more depth the interrelationship between the
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 187121 and the development of federal jurisdictional principles. As I have suggested, the
Court appears to have implemented dramatically different visions
of the appropriate solicitude to be afforded local judicial process in
assessing the validity of a section 1983 claim. Given the essentially
historical or intentional model of statutory interpretation that the
Court has claimed to employ, it is difficult to understand how the
Justices can expect to have it both ways. One would guess that the
drafters of the Civil Rights Act either meant to incorporate traditional notions of deference to state judicial actors, or they did not.
The random and inconsistent use of legislative purpose to measure
statutory demands is hardly an advisable method of interpretation.
Not surprisingly, the manipulation of statutory intention reflected
in the Court's decisions has led to claims that some of the cornerstones of federal courts jurisprudence are illegitimate. 22
See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540 (1984).
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
20
See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980).
21
Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-1986 (1982)).
Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (widely known as the Ku Klux Act) was the
predecessor to § 1983. See the discussion in Part I infra.
•• See, e.g., Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers and the Limits of the Judicial
18

10
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In Part II, then, I explore the legislative intent behind section
1983. My particular concern is the drafters' design, or lack of it,
that the provision secure relief against state judicial process. I conclude that the overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that the
statute's framers sought to provide a federal cause of action to
remedy miscarriages of justice at the hands of state jurists. It
hardly overstates the case, in fact, to suggest that forcing state judicial officers to toe the constitutional mark was one of the primary motivations for the enactment of section 1983.
Part III considers the relevance of this historical claim. Section
1983, I argue, was designed to afford an extremely intrusive federal
remedy. Given the exigency under which the enactment was
passed, deference to local officials was hardly a concern of the
drafters. Yet the circumstances of the Reconstruction South are
not our own. Nor could the framers of the statute have envisioned
the role that section 1983 plays in our present constitutional structure. Rather than serving as a vehicle to assure minimum legal protection for blacks and oppressed Unionists, section 1983 now provides a conduit for the presentation of all constitutional claims
against state and local actors. An interventionist cause of action
under the Civil Rights Act, therefore, creates frictions with the independent operation of state judiciaries that did not exist a century ago. As a result, the argument for discarding the intention of
section 1983's framers carries substantial appeal.
Departing from statutory design, however, poses major problems
of judicial legitimacy. Updating statutes, ignoring intention, and
modifying enactments to suit present need each suggest substantial departures from traditional visions of the judicial role. In the
fmal Part, I conclude that reasonable modern interpretation of section 1983 does not demand such radical surgery. Given the broad
scope of the modern section 1983 cause of action, it may well be
that the statute can achieve its underlying purposes only by incorporating aspects of deference to local officials that the framers
would not have embraced. Borrowing then from other fields of le-

Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71, 86 (1984); Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1143 (1977); Zeigler, A Reassessment of the
Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 Duke L.J. 987,
988; Nichol, An Activism of Ambivalence (Book Review), 98 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 320 n.28
(1984).
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gal and statutory analysis, I suggest an interpretive strategy that
allows section 1983 to accomplish its modern mission as the central
vehicle of constitutional enforcement without abrogating the fundamental intentions of the statute's drafters.
I.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND SECTION

1983

Perhaps the strongest and most direct legislative statement concerning the relationship between the state and federal courts is the
Anti-Injunction Act.23 This statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, provides that
"a court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."24 It should not be surprising,.
then, that the most complete judicial exploration of the relationship between the section 1983 cause of action and the deference
appropriately afforded state courts appears in a case interpreting
the Anti-Injunction Act.
Mitchum v. Foster, 25 decided in 1972, ruled that section 1983 is
an "expressly authorized" exception to the Act. 26 At one level, the
decision was a surprising one. The 1871 Civil .Rights Act hardly
creates an exception to the injunctive ban in express terms.
Mitchum, however, determined that an "expressly authorized" exception results from any statutory enactment "clearly creating a
federal right or remedy [that] ... could be given its intended
scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding."27 This formulation has been vigorously criticized.28 Regardless of its merits, however, the "intended scope" determination required the Court to examine both the goals and the desired breadth of section 1983. The
majority opinion's conclusions were of interest.
Citing the 1875 decision in Ex parte Virginia, 29 the Justices concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was "intended to enforce
28 u.s.c. § 2283 (1982).
Id.
2
" 407 U.S. 225 (1972). In Mitchum, the plaintiff sought an injunction against a
prosecutorial proceeding to close down his bookstore.
26
Id. at 243.
21
Id. at 238.
26
See Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 329 (1978);
Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 717, 733-39 (1977).
20
100 u.s. 339 (1879).
23

2

'
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the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 'against state action,
. . . whether that action be executive, legislative or judicial.' " 30
Quoting statements offered by several of the statute's key congressional supporters, the Mitchum opinion suggested that the framers
of section 1983 viewed state judiciaries as having "proven themselves [in]competent":31 either "powerless to stop deprivations or
. . . in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights."32 According to the Court, the statute's drafters debated "not about whether the predecessor of § 1983 extended
to actions of state courts, but whether this innovation was necessary or desirable."33 Having determined that state judicial officers
shared the prevalent Southern antipathy toward nationally secured
liberties, the proponents of the legislation attempted to ensure
both legal and equitable relief in federal tribunals.34 Accordingly,
Mitchum held that section 1983 "is an Act of Congress that falls
within the 'expressly authorized' exception of [the Anti-Injunction
Act]."35
For present purposes at least, it is unimportant whether the
Mitchum decision is an acceptable reading of 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Regardless of the validity of that interpretive claim, the portrait the
opinion paints of the design of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is clear.
The evils that the enactment sought to cure-in general terms,
wholesale deprivations of basic civil liberties-were thought to be
ignored, or even aided, by state judiciaries. The intended scope of
the legislation, therefore, necessarily demands the availability of
equitable interference with state judicial process. That vision of
section 1983's purposes, however, creates real tensions with the
Court's decision from the previous term in Younger v. Harris. 36
Younger's conclusion is well known. In this case too a section
1983 litigant sought injunctive relief against a pending state suit.
Writing for the Court, Justice Black concluded, however, that "the
•• Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879) (emphasis added in Mitchum)).
•• Id. (quoting remarks of Sen. Osborn, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (1871)
[hereinafter 42 Globe]).
•• Id. at 240.
•• Id. at 241-42.
•• See id.
•• Id. at 243.
•• 401 u.s. 37 (1971).
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national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending
state court proceedings except under special circumstances" barred
the action. 37 According to Justice Black, "[t]he notion of 'comity,'
that is, a proper respect for state functions," rooted in "Our Federalism," was the "vital consideration" demanding dismissal.38 The
subsequent Mitchum decision, of course, claimed not to "question
or qualify in any way" the "principles of equity, comity, and federalism" on which Younger had so recently been based. 39 As anumber of commentators have stressed, however, the distinction is less
than convincing.40 Mitchum suggests that the Reconstruction Congress enacting section 1983 weighed the federal-state balance, at
least when the normal principles of equity jurisprudence were
met/ 1 in favor of national intervention. Younger, then, appears to
be at odds with the congressional mandate. 42
Setting aside for the moment the question of Younger's legitimacy, it is clear that the deference toward state judiciaries that
Younger demands of section 1983 litigants cannot be squared with
the language of the Mitchum decision. Mitchum bespoke distrust
of "incompetent" and "powerless" local tribunals. 43 Younger's
progeny offer "scrupulous regard [to] the rightful independence of
state governments."44 Although Mitchum described state judges as
a significant part of the problem,45 the Younger cases refuse to depart from the "'principle that state courts have the solemn responsibility equally with the federal [courts] to safeguard constitutional
rights." 46 Younger's doctrine of restraint is expressly rooted in a
fear that intervention would "reflec[t] negatively upon the state
court's" willingness to recognize these federal rights. 47 The premise
that the Younger cases take such strides to avoid lies at
ld. at 41.
ld. at 44.
39
Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243.
40
See sources cited supra note 22.
•• See Redish, supra note 22, at 88; see also infra note 214 (discussion of Younger as a
principle of equity jurisprudence).
n See Nichol, supra note 22, at 320 n.28.
43
See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240-41.
« Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1979) (quoting Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312
u.s. 45, 50 (1941)).
•• See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240-42.
•• Trainor, 431 U.S. at 443 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974)).
47
Id. at 443 (quoting Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462)).
37

38
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Mitchum's, if not section 1983's, core.
But this long-recognized tension in jurisdictional analysis is only
the most prominent example of the inconsistent application of section 1983 to state judiciaries. Injunctions are not the sole tools by
which federal judges can be said to interfere with their local counterparts. In Pierson v. Ray, 48 for example, the Supreme Court
ruled that state and local judges are absolutely immune from section 1983 damage claims arising from their judicial actions. 49 The
statute, of course, alludes to no such immunity. Its terms suggest,
rather, that a cause of action at law or in equity lies against "every
person" who under color of law causes a deprivation of federally
protected rights. So the Pierson Court grounded the case for immunity in the legislative intent of the framers of the statute. Primarily because "[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at
common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages," the Justices concluded that the "legislative record gives no
clear indication that Congress meant to abolish" such traditional
protections. 50
More recently, however, Pulliam v. Allen51 seemed to take a different tack. 52 There the Court ruled that judicial immunity was not
a bar to prospective injunctive relief under section 1983. Again, the
result was based on legislative intent. Almost as if Pierson and
Younger had never been decided, the opinion declared that "Congress enacted § 1983 . . . to provide an independent avenue for
the protection of federal constitutional rights . . . because 'state
courts were being used to harass and injure individuals' . . . . " 53
Even more surprisingly, the Court noted that "every member of
Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that judges would be lia•• 386 u.s. 547 (1967).
•• See id. at 553-55.
•• Id. at 553-54•
•, 466 u.s. 522 (1984).
•• Pulliam made an explicit holding of the dicta from Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 735 (1980) ("[W]e have never held that judicial immunity absolutely insulates judges from declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to their judicial
acts."). See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 536.
I realize, of course, that there are distinctions to be drawn among the circumstances
presented in Younger, Pulliam, and Pierson. Some of these are discussed in Section III.C of
this Article. The inconsistency I mean to emphasize lies in the Court's use of Reconstruction
history.
•• Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 540 (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240).
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hie under § 1983."54 Pierson's history and Pulliam's history are impossible to square. Nor, unfortunately, do the judicial pirouettes
stop there.
Injunctive decrees and damage awards enforced by federal
courts against state judges are perhaps the most direct, and the
most threatening, interchanges between the two judicial systems.
The judiciaries necessarily interact in more subtle ways. If the subject matter of a federal section 1983 action involves claims that
have been previously litigated in a state forum, the appropriate
deference to be afforded the prior ruling must be determined. Allen v. McCurry, 55 speaking to that issue, held that normal principles of collateral estoppel apply to section 1983 claims. 56 Accordingly, a section 1983 tribunal must give binding effect to a state
court determination in which the parties have been given a full
and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims. 57 McCurry's theory
is reminiscent of Younger and Pierson. According to the opinion,
"nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983 proves any
Congressional intent to deny binding effect to a state-court judgment."58 The acceptance of collateral estoppel principles was
thought essential to avoid the expression of a "general distrust of
the capacity of state courts to render correct decisions on consitutional issues."59 That very distrust, of course, is the underlying
premise of Mitchum and Pulliam. It also provides the rationale for
yet another cornerstone of federal jurisdiction, Monroe v. Pape. 60
McCurry addressed the ramifications of a section 1983 plaintiff's
prior litigation in the case forum. Monroe, on the other hand, explored the significance of the failure of a federal civil rights litigant
to seek available redress in the state courts before filing suit.61 Besides ushering in a major transformation of the section 1983 cause
of action by offering a more generous interpretation of the "under
color of law" requirement, 62 Monroe ruled that civil rights plainId. at 540 (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 558-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting)) .
449 u.s. 90 (1980).
See id. at 105.
See id. at 103-05.
Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 105.
365 u.s. 167 (1961).
81
See id. at 174-82.
•• See id. at 181-87 ("under color of state Jaw" includes actions by state officials that are
in violation of state law). It is not my purpose in this essay to consider the propriety of
..
••
••
••
••
••
••
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tiffs are not required to exhaust state judicial remedies before
seeking federal relief. 68 Once again, the Court's conclusion was
grounded in the legislative history of section 1983.64 Citing the
statements of a variety of the statute's sponsors, the Court determined that the framers of the Civil Rights Act saw state courts as
part of the problem, not as a potential solution to the abrogation
of federal interests. In the "judicial tribunals [of the states] one
class is unable to secure the enforcement of their rights." 65 "Justice
closes the door of her temples."66 The "courts of the southern
states fail and refuse to do their duty." 67 These and similar statements by members of the 1871 Congress were offered to demonstrate that it would be inconsistent with the statute's design to relegate the victims of oppressive state actions to local courts. 68 Thus
Monroe v. Pape, the centerpiece of section 1983 jurisprudence, is
founded on the historical premises embraced by Mitchum and Pulliam, but rejected by Younger, Pierson, and McCurry. 69
To be sure, these diverse lines of federal courts analysis are
treated as autonomous and independent entities by the Supreme
Court. Their contradictory results are rendered less apparent by a
jurisprudence that seemingly demands no interrelationship between the interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act and the principles of equitable intervention, for example, or between the prospective and retrospective liability of state judges for civil rights
violations. So rigid a formalism, however, hides little and reveals
much.
Monroe's holding on the under color of law issue. Justice Douglas' opinion in Monroe has
recently been criticized in Zagrans, Under Color of What Law?: A Reconstructed Model of
Section 1983 Liability, 71 Va. L. Rev. 499 (1985). Professor Zagrans essentially resurrects
Justice Frankfurter's dissenting argument in Monroe v. Pape. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 20259 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The extent to which this argument bears upon my thesis is
discussed infra note 165.
•• See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
.. See id. at 172-84.
•• Id. at 177 (quoting Rep. Burchard, 42 Globe, supra note 31, app. at 315).
•• Id. at 178 (quoting Sen. Pratt, 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 505).
•• Id. at 179 (quoting Rep. Voorhees, 42 Globe, supra note 31, app. at 179 (speaking in
opposition to the bill)).
•• See id. at 176-80.
•• Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), reached a similar conclusion on the
issue of exhaustion of state administrative remedies. See id. at 502-12. Like Monroe, Patsy
justified its conclusion by turning to the legislative history of§ 1983. Patsy determined that
the framers of the Civil Rights Act expressed "mistrust . . . for the factfinding processes of
state institutions." Id. at 506. Patsy, therefore, is at odds with the reading of § 1983 intention reflected in Younger, McCurry, and Pierson.
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None of the six cases, or lines of cases, described purport to be
exercises in constitutional interpretation. Mitchum, Pulliam, and
Monroe, the decisions authorizing federal judicial intervention, offer statutory justifications for their assertions of power. The rulings demanding heightened deference to state courts, Younger,
Pierson, and McCurry, do so without reference to constitutional
mandate. And there is good reason for the omission. Younger's vision of "Our Federalism" would be difficult to locate in the constitutional charter. Justice Black, a theorist who usually had no
trouble identifying the demands of constitutional principle,70 characterized it only as a "national policy."71 The tenth amendment,
one supposes, would be the most likely textual source. But that
provision has repeatedly eluded judicial efforts to measure its content.72 And, at a minimum, Mitchum would have to be read as a
"carving out" from traditional notions of state sovereignty any immunity from injunctive intervention enjoyed by state courts.73
Pierson's doctrine of judicial immunity from damage actions, like
the host of other absolute and qualified section 1983 immunities,
fmds its genesis in the common law.74 In addition, if Pulliam's determination that state judges enjoy no similar shield from prospective relief is correct, then a residual constitutional protection from
damage suits seems even more implausible. McCurry applied concepts of collateral estoppel to section 1983 claims because it uncovered no "congressional intent" to dislodge traditional rules of preclusion.711 Implicitly, the opinion suggests that a contrary
determination would have withstood constitutional scrutiny.76
As a result, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the
opinions described above are nonconstitutional in nature. All are
section 1983 cases as well. That leaves the question of their inter10
See, for example, Justice Black's opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (arguing for absolutist view of the first amendment).
11
Younger, 401 U.S. at 41.
12
Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that the
tenth amendment limited the federal government's authority to regulate state and local governments) with Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities).
13
·
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976).
14
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967).
15
See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980).
18
See id. at 104-05.

Section 1983

1987]

971

relationship in a more complex posture than the opinions of the
Supreme Court suggest. Mitchum, Pulliam, and Monroe interpret
section 1983 to provide an intrusive cause of action that is to operate largely undeterred by traditional notions of deference to local
judicial officers. Younger, Pierson, and McCurry, on the other
hand, read the same statute to demand substantial solicitude for
the independence of state judiciaries. It simply cannot be the case
that both camps of decisions represent accurate interpretations of
the language and legislative history of section 1983. Accordingly, it
is to that task that I now turn.
•
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

1983

The language of section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the person injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. 77

In seeking to determine whether the section 1983 cause of action
extends to deprivations of "rights, privileges, or immunities" at the
hands of state judges, the phrase "every person" must provide the
point of departure. It is uncontroversial that " [w ]hat a legislature
says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the
legislative intent."78 And "every person," as Justice Douglas
claimed, presumably means "every person, not every person except judges."79 Although the Civil Rights Act of 1871, at the time
of its enactment, read "any person" rather than "every person,"80
both terms denote all-inclusiveness. The source of the language
eventually codified in section 1983 strengthens the suggestion that
state judges were intended to be brought within its purview.
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982).
•• 2A J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.03, at 82 (4th ed. 1984).
•• Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80
The present § 1983 underwent minor revision (including the "every person" alteration)
and recodification in the general statutory revision of 1874. See Rev. Stat.§ 1979 (1873-74);
see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11, 14-16 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (revisions
were nonsubstantive); 2 Cong. Rec. 129, 646-48, 825-27 (1874) (congressional remarks emphasizing preservation of statutory substance).
71
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A. The 1866 Act
Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the specific precursor of section 1983, was patterned after a criminal provision in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.81 Employing the now familiar phraseology, section two of the 1866 statute declared that "any person who,
under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,"
deprived an inhabitant of a state of certain federally protected
rights was subject to a "fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. " 82 Much to the dissatisfaction of the Reconstruction Congress, President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Johnson's veto message made
clear that one of his principal objections to the statute was the
alarming impact he believed it would have on state judiciaries.83
The potential conviction of state judges had, in fact, been a theme
considered by both houses. 84 An amendment excluding judges from
the operation of the law had been offered and rejected. 85 Senator
Trumbull, one of the 1866 Act's chief proponents, delivered a
point-by-point refutation of the veto message on the floor of the
Senate. Trumbull argued that the doctrine of judicial immunity
"places officials above the law. It is the very doctrine out of which
the rebellion was hatched. " 86 On the House side, Congressman
Lawrence declared that "it is better to invade the judicial power of
the State than permit it to invade, strike down, and destroy the
civil rights of citizens. " 87 The Congress responded by overriding
the presidential veto and enacting the 1866 Act as law.
The "any person" language of the 1871 Act, therefore, was born
in context. The Congress and the President had joined issue on the
applicability of the phrase to state judges five years earlier. Thus
when Congressman Shellabarger introduced the Civil Rights Act of
Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-1986 (1982)).
Id. § 2.
83
See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679, 1680-81 (1866) [hereinafter 39 Globe).
84
See Zagrans, supra note 62, at 544.
80
See 39 Globe, supra note 83, at 1156.
88
Id. at 1758 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull). See generally Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 Yale L.J. 322, 327 & n.36 (1969) (quoting similar statements
by other members of Congress).
87
39 Globe, supra note 83, at 1837 (remarks of Rep. Lawrence).
81
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1871 he described section two of the Act-the predecessor of section 1983-as a straightforward, almost noncontroversial provision
modeled on the 1866 Act: "That section provides a criminal proceeding in identically the same case as this one provides a civil
remedy . . . ." 88 Shellabarger also informed his colleagues that the
proposed act was "remedial, and in aid of the preservation of
human liberty." Accordingly, it would be "liberally and beneficently construed . . . [providing] the largest latitude consistent
with the words employed. "89 Both the language and the legislative
legacy under which section 1983 was proposed, therefore, give rise
to at least a substantial presumption that the statute was designed
to reach state judicial actors.
B.

The 1871 Congress

But what of the attitudes of the Congress of 1871? On March 23,
1871, President Grant sent a message to the Reconstruction Congress seeking legislation that would "effectually secure life, liberty,
and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United
States." 90 Prior bearings of the Senate Committee on Reconstruction had revealed the existence of violent outrages directed against
blacks and sympathetic whites throughout the South. 91 These acts
were believed to be the work of the newly emerged Ku Klux Klan,
a secretive organization thought to be led by former Confederate
officers.
Grant's message was referred to a select committee created for
the occasion, and five days later the bill was reported to the House
of Representatives. Catching the tenor of the time, Congressman
Stoughton argued that the provision was needed because " [t ]here
exists . . . in the southern States a treasonable conspiracy against
the lives, persons and property of Union citizens, less formidable it
may be, but not less dangerous, to American liberty than that
which inaugurated the horrors of the rebellion. " 92 Within a month,
section 1983 was one of a number of provisions enacted as the Ku
88
42 Globe, supra note 31, app. at 68 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger) .
•• ld.
•• ld. at 244 (message of President Grant).
•• See L. Warsoff, Equality and tbe Law 109-10 (1938); Gressman, The Unhappy History
of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1323, 1329-30 (1952).
•• 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 320 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton).

974

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 73:959

Klux Act of 1871.93 The Supreme Court was thus apparently correct in Collins v. Hardyman 94 when it declared that section 1983
"was passed by a partisan vote in a highly inflamed atmosphere. It
was preceded by spirited debate which pointed out its grave character and susceptibility to abuse . . . ." 95
The refusal of state courts to protect the fundamental human
liberties of both Unionists and the newly freed slaves was a major
focus of the legislative debates on both sections one and two of the
Act. 96 That is hardly surprising. Given the recent passage of the
Civil War amendments, if state judiciaries could have been
counted on to enforce the provisions of the federal constitution,
the entire legislative scheme would have been unnecessary. The
proponents of the statute leveled two broad charges at state courts.
First, as the result of Klan intimidation, and perhaps empathy, lo-

93
See 1 B. Schwartz, Statutory History of the United States: Civil Rights 591-653 (1970).
The Senate passed the Act 36-13 on April 19, 1871, and the House followed the next day.
See Zeigler, supra note 22, at 1019•
•• 341 u.s. 651 (1951).
•• ld. at 657.
•• See, e.g., 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 320 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton) ("[I]t is impossible for the civil authorities ... to punish those who perpetrate these outrages."); id. at 322
("[State court] denial of the equal protection of the laws is too clear to admit of question ...."); see also id. at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey); id. at 429 (remarks of Rep.
Beatty); id. at 505 (remarks of Sen. Pratt); id. at 654 (remarks of Sen. Osborn); id. app. at
153 (remarks of Rep. Garfield); id. app. at 179 (remarks of Rep. Voorhees); id. app. at 277
(remarks of Rep. Porter); id. app. at 315 (remarks of Rep. Burchard).
Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was perhaps the least controversial, and the
least debated, provision of the statute. Several of the references that follow relate either to
section two (creating certain federal crimes) or to the Act generally. In Patsy v. Board of
Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), the Supreme Court concluded that "some of the debates relating to § 2 ... are also relevant to our discussion of § 1." Id. at 502 n.5.
That is a reasonable judgment. Section one, by its terms, creates a broad cause of action-without expressly recognizing protections from scrutiny for state tribunals-against
"any person" causing the deprivation of a constitutional right. The remaining provisions of
the Act, as well as the debates over their enactment, provide the best circumstantial evidence of the framers' desire, or lack thereof, to incorporate deference to state actors into
this particular legislative scheme. The debates, as a whole, depict a consistent vision of the
distrust the 1871 Congress entertained for state courts. That distrust, along with pointed
references about the applicability of the statute to state judges and the aggressive nature of
the entire enactment, combine, I claim below, to present a strong case for the full
cognizability of state judicial acts under § 1983. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying
text. "A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one
general purpose and intent. . . . Thus it is not proper to confine interpretation to . . . one
section to be construed." 2A J. Sutherland, supra note 78, § 46.05, at 90.
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cal courts were portrayed as "under the control" 97 of conspirators
and "unable or unwilling to check the evil." 98 "Violence and lawlessness [being] universally prevalent," Republicans characterized
state courts as "notoriously powerless to protect life, person and
property."99 Congressman Beatty complained that prejudiced
southern judges, "by reason of popular sentiment or secret organizations ... [deny] the rights and privileges due an American citizen."100 Senator Morton, speaking in terms fairly representative of
the Act's supporters, 101 concluded that "the States do not protect
the rights of the people; ... [and] State courts are powerless to
redress these wrongs. The great fact remains that large classes of
people ... are without legal remedy in the courts of the States."~ 02
The framers of section 1983, in short, believed that local judges
had abdicated their responsibility to ensure evenhanded enforcement of the law. 103
The second accusation was even more serious. Not only were local judiciaries "impotent,"104 legislators considered many judges to
be in league with the Klan. Senator Osborn argued that state
courts were under the influence of the Klan oath. 105 Congressman
Rainey claimed that local tribunals were "secretly in sympathy
with the very evil against which we are striving." 106 Congressman
•• 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey).
•• Id. at 321 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton).
•• Id. at 322 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton); see also id. at 244 (President Grant's message:
"That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not
doubt.").
100
Id. at 429 (remarks of Rep. Beatty).
101
See, e.g., id. at 653 (remarks of Sen. Osborn) ("If the state courts bad proven themselves competent to suppress the local disorders, or to maintain law and order, we should
not have been called upon to legislate upon this subject at all."); id. at 505 (remarks of Sen.
Pratt) ("[T]be arm of justice is paralyzed[;] ... punishment bas not been inflicted in a
single case of the hundreds of outrages which have occurred."); id. at 368 (remarks of Rep.
Sheldon) ("Governors, judges, and juries give way to a mania which sometimes seizes hold of
the popular mind."); id. app. at 277 (remarks of Rep. Porter) ("[L]oyal men cannot obtain
justice in the courts.").
102
ld. app. at 252 (remarks of Sen. Morton).
103
See, e.g., id. app. at 78 (remarks of Rep. Perry) ("[J]udges, having ears to hear, hear
not.").
, .. E.g., id. at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn) ("[T]he courts are impotent, the laws are
annulled[,] ..• the persecuted citizen looks in vain for redress.").
10
" See id. app. at 653 (remarks of Sen. Osborn).
lo& Id. app. at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey).
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Platt took the charge even further, alleging that
the decisions of the county judges, who are made little kings, with
almost despotic powers to carry out the partisan demands of the
Legislature which elected them-powers which, almost without exception, have been exercised against Republicans without regard to
law or justice, make up a catalogue of wrongs, outrageous violations, and evasions of the spirit of the new constitution, unscrupulous malignity and partisan hate never paralleled in the history of
parties in this country or any other. 107 ·

Strong stuff, no doubt. But even wading through the demagoguery,
the passages suggest that many of the framers of section 1983 considered state judges to be active and energetic participants in a
pervasive effort to deprive a substantial segment of the southern
populace of fundamental human liberties.
Broadly speaking, therefore, the proponents of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 regarded state judges as central players in the southern
tragedy they sought to eliminate. At best, local courts were afraid
of the Klan. Accordingly, "[the state courts] only fail in efficency
when a man of known Union sentiments, white or black, invokes
their aid." 108 At worst, southern judges could be "wholly inimical
to the impartial administration of law and equity."109 As a result,
section 1983 sought to address what its framers saw as a near complete breakdown of justice in the South. The "records of the public
tribunals," Republicans claimed, "are searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress." 110
The opponents of the legislation were just as vehement. They
also seemed to have little doubt of the provision's applicability to
state tribunals. Congressman Voorhees rejected what he considered
to be a central premise of the Civil Rights Act, "that the courts of
the southern States fail and refuse to do their duty."m Others
drew vivid portraits of the potential plight of southern judges
should the bill be enacted. Congressman Lewis lamented that
"[b]y the first section [i.e., section 1983] ... the judge of a State
court, though acting under oath of office, is made liable to a suit in
101
108
109
110
111

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

app. at 186 (remarks of Rep. Platt).
at 505 (remarks of Sen. Pratt).
at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey).
at 374 (remarks of Rep. Lowe).
app. at 179 (remarks of Rep. Voorhees).
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the Federal court and subject to damages[,]
. however honest
and conscientious [his] decision may be." 112 Congressman Arthur
charged that "every judge in the state court ... will enter upon
and pursue the call of official duty with the sword of Damocles
suspended over him." 113 Senator Thurman asked: "What is to be
the case of a judge? ... Is he to be liable in an action? ... [I]t is
the language of the bill; for there is no limitation whatsoever upon
the terms that are employed, and they are as comprehensive as can
be used." 114 Thurman also stressed that fears of application of the
statute to state judges were not fanciful: "There have been two or
three instances already under the [Civil Rights Act of 1866] of
State judges being taken into the United States district court . . .
for the offense, forsooth, of honestly and conscientiously deciding
the law to be as they understood it to be."115
In a case from the 1960's recognizing judicial immunity under
section 1983, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the relevance of such objections as "little more than
opposition remarks," not to be given substantial credence unless
proponents offered no reply. 116 As one commentator has pointed
out, Congressman Shellabarger-sponsor of the bill and a debater
not unwilling to interrupt an adversary-was on the floor when
such statements were made and he presented no rebuttal. 117 Had
the statute's drafters desired to escape the power of their opponents' claim, it would hardly have been difficult to insert language
recognizing judicial or other common law immunities into the
lengthy enactment. Moreover, as I have indicated, proponents of
the Act regarded the need to force state judges to toe the constitutional mark as a central premise of the legislation. But more importantly, these arguments in mitigation are largely beside the
point. The cramped interpretation suggested by the Third Circuit
approaches the problem from the wrong direction.
112

ld. at 385 (remarks of Rep. Lewis).
ld. at 366 (remarks of Rep. Arthur); see also id. at 361 (remarks of Rep. Swann)
("[The bill] turns the whole current of State jurisprudence into the Federal Courts .•..").
114
Id. app. at 217 (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
uo Id.
111
Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 588 n.8 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021
(1967).
117
See Note, supra note 86, at 328 n.40. Three times during the debates legislators
claimed the Act applied to judges, and no one denied the allegation. See id. at 328.
113
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It is perhaps possible, though only barely so, to claim that the
statements of legislators do not conclusively prove that section
1983 was designed to apply to local judges. But such proof, under
normal principles of statutory construction, is unnecessary. By its
express terms, section 1983 applies to "every person." There is, of
course, "no safer nor better settled canon of interpretation than
that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to
mean what it plainly expresses."118 It is not apparent to me that
the language of section 1983 can be reasonably seen as anything
other than a model of clarity concerning its applicability to state
judges. Nonetheless, a challenge to its "plain meaning" traditionally demands a showing "that the provision itself is repugnant to
the general purview of the act ... or [that] the legislative history
... imports a different meaning." 119 Given the overwhelming indication from the record that the framers thought the statute would
apply to state courts, it is inconceivable that the burden of demonstrating that the legislative history demands a result contrary to
the language could be met. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the
Court in Pulliam is apparently correct in its claim that "every
Member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that judges
would be liable under § 1983. " 120

C. The Legal Landscape
Even if it is clear that the "any person" phraseology of section
1983 was meant to include state judges, a variety of questions concerning the interrelationship of the two judicial systems remain. It
may well be that the legislative history suggests that judges, in
their official capacities, can appropriately be the subject of either
equitable or damage claims under the statute. But what of the
need to exhaust state judicial remedies, or the applicability of
traditional principles of collateral estoppel to section 1983 suits?
The mere determination that judges are correct defendants hardly
provides an answer to these more subtle clashes between state and
federal courts. Perhaps because the text of the statute is silent on
such issues, in cases like Monroe and McCurry the Supreme Court
118
2A J. Sutherland, supra note 78, § 46.01, at 73 (quoting Swarts v. Siegel, 117 F. 13, 1819 (8th Cir. 1902)).
"" Id. at 74.
120
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540 (1984).
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explored the intentions of section 1983's framers to determine
their attitude toward state tribunals. Monroe, it will be recalled,
concluded that the "legislative history" revealed the bill to be a
remedy for state tribunals "unable or unwilling" to administer justice evenhandedly. 121 McCurry, on the other hand, found that
there was "nothing in the language or legislative history of§ 1983"
to suggest that Congress intended "to deny binding effect to a
state-court judgment . . . when the state court . . . has given the
parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims," 122 and
dismissed the argument that state courts could not be trusted to
"render correct decisions on constitutional issues." 123
Monroe and McCurry cannot be correct representations of the
framers' confidence in state court process. But the inquiry that
they suggest seems a sensible one. Judge Posner has advocated a
method of statutory interpretation labeled "imaginative reconstruction."124 Acording to its dictates, "the judge should try to put
himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure out how
they would have wanted the statute applied to the case before
him." 1211 In some measure, that is what Monroe and McCurry attempt to do. Neither exhaustion of remedies nor collateral estoppel
in section 1983 suits has been treated as a constitutional issue. As
a result, the Justices have, at least in theory, turned to the statute
for guidance. Because the language of the provision offers little direction, opinions have asked, in more and less direct ways, whether
the framers of section 1983 would have demanded deference to
state courts through exhaustion or collateral bar. Specifically, this
inquiry has tended to focus-though reaching diametrically opposite conclusions in the two lines of cases-on the level of trust the
1871 Congress entertained for local judiciaries. The intention of
the drafters, therefore, can here be of at least preliminary use.
There is substantial direct evidence that the framers of the Civil
Rights Act would have rejected an exhaustion requirement and the
use of preclusion. Congressman Bingham, for example, claimed
that even "[a]dmitting that the States have concurrent power to
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 176 (1961).
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980).
123
Id. at 105.
'"' See R. Posner, The Federal Courts 286-87 (1985).
120
Id.
121
1

u
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enforce the Constitution of the United States within their respective limits, must we wait for their action? Are not laws preventive,
as well as remedial?m 26 Arguing against waiting for local process to
run its course, Congressman Elliott called for "immediate jurisdiction through [the federal] courts, without the appeal or agency of
the state."127 And opponents complained that section one of the
Act "does not even give the State courts a chance to try questions"
prior to federal intervention. 128 Other comments suggest a heavy
legislative preference for litigation in the federal courts, thus casting doubt on the use of collateral estoppel in section 1983 claims.
Congressman Coburn suggested that the "United States courts are
further above mere local influence than the county courts; their
judges can act with more independence, cannot be put under terror, as local judges can."129 Congressman Dawes similarly claimed
that there "is no tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact justice
would be more likely to be meted out in temper, in moderation,
and in severity, if need be, ... as that great tribunal of the
Constitution. " 130
Nor need the inquiry stop there. It is also true, of course, that
much of the foregoing analysis of legislative intent is relevant to
the issue of deference to local judicial process. The mere fact that
the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 created a cause of action to be directed, at least in some instances, to local judges says
much about their regard for state judiciaries. The strongest reason
that the "any" or "every" person language cannot, on the basis of
legislative intent alone, be read as embracing an exception for state
j"~;1dges is that the abuses of local judiciaries played so prominent a
role in the evils the statute was designed to address. Although that
underlying goal may not, on its own, demonstrate that the framers
of the statute would have afforded little deference to local process,
it certainly provides support for such a claim.
But perhaps the most telling circumstantial evidence of theReconstruction Congress' willingness to override local process lies in

42 Globe, supra note 31, app. at 85 (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
Id. at 389 (remarks of Rep. Elliot).
128
Id. app. at 86 (remarks of Rep. Storm). For other comments weighing against exhaustion, see id. at 332 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id. at 375 (remarks of Rep. Lowe); id. at 448-49
(remarks of Rep. Butler).
129
Id. at 460 (remarks of Rep. Coburn).
130
Id. at 476 (remarks of Rep. Dawes).
128
127
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the language of the statute itself. An examination of the remainder
of the provisions of the Ku Klux Act of 1871 compels one to conclude that its drafters were basically unconcerned with potential
offense to state officials. The modern section 1983 was but one of
seven sections of the original Act. The other six provisions, which
have since either expired or been repealed or recodified, 131 offer
strong medicine. Section two provided a criminal sanction for the
commission of a variety of conspiratorial acts. On the checklist of
proscribed activities were conspiracy to "overthrow, or to put
down, or to destroy by force the government of the United States";
"to levy war against the United States"; "to seize . . . any property
of the United States"; "to prevent any person" from holding office
"under the United States"; and to prevent "the election of any
lawfully qualified person as an elector of the President or VicePresident of the United States."~ 32 Section three addressed cases
of "insurrection, domestic violence, [and] unlawful ... conspiracies" so pronounced that the state government "shall either be unable to protect, or shall, from any cause, fail . . . or refuse protection of the people. " 133 The remedy the provision set forth was "the
employment of the militia or the land and naval forces of the
United States" at the direction of the President. 134 Section three
thus authorized the most intrusive remedy imaginable-martial
law. It also anticipated that a state government might intentionally
"refuse protection of the people."135
Section four provided, in part, that when "constituted [state] authorities are in complicity with . . . powerful and armed combinations, . . . it shall be lawful for the President of the United States
. . . to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, to the
end that such rebellion may be overthrown."136 This provision was
temporary, expiring "after the end of the next regular session of
131
Section two of the Act, for example, was the predecessor of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Section
six preceded 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Section four expired "after the end of the next regular session of Congress." Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 13, 15 (expired 1873).
... Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13, partially repealed by Act of Feb. 8,
1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (current version of § 2 at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982)).
133
Id. § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14, repealed by Act of Aug. 10, 1956, cb. 1041, § 53, 70A Stat. 641,

644.
13

'

13•
131

Id.
Id.
Id. § 4, 17 Stat. 13, 14-15 (expired 1873).
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Congress."137 It obviously contemplated, however, a complete disruption of local judicial process during its pendency. It also recognized the possibility that lawful state governments would conspire
with anti-Union terrorists. Section five required the taking of a
non-conspiracy oath in open court by federal jurors. 138 The final
substantive section created a civil action against "any person" having knowledge of acts which would violate various provisions of the
statute and who, "having power to prevent or aid in preventing the
same, shall neglect or refuse so to do. " 139
As a package then, the sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
offered a massively intrusive set of remedies to deal with what
President Grant and the supporters of the legislation regarded as a
national crisis only marginally less threatening than the war itself.
It is perhaps helpful to recall that within months of its enactment,
President Grant was forced to deploy its provisions by suspending
habeas corpus in nine counties of South Carolina to combat lawlessness "out of control."140 The statute thus reflected a legislative
belief that drastic circumstances demand drastic responses. 141 As
Senator Edmonds put it, "every measure of constitutional legislation which will have a tendency to preserve life and liberty . . .
ought to be resorted to." 142 And as Senator Poole claimed, if this
effort to ensure a "civil equality of all citizens" through the courts
should "fail in its enforcement, the military power [would have to]
be used." 143 The various sections authorized the punishment of insurrection, the suspension of habeas corpus, and the use of the
armed forces. Legislators who press for such sanctions are unlikely
to have worried about the possibility that they might offend local
jurists by casting doubt on the ability of state courts to decide on
federal claims. Section six is particularly instructive in this regard.
By authorizing suit against those who "have power to prevent" vio137 ld.
"" See id.
139
ld. § 6, 17 Stat. 13, 15 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1982)).
140
W. McFeely, Grant: A Biography 370 (1981).
141
See, e.g., 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 321 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton) ("The whole
South . . . is rapidly drifting into a state of anarchy and bloodshed, which renders the worst
Government on the face of the earth respectable by way of comparison. There is no security
for life, person, or property."); id. app. at 199 (remarks of Rep. Snyder) ("Anarchy and
violence are supreme . . . .").
142
ld. at 691 (remarks of Sen. Edmonds).
143
Id. at 609 (remarks of Sen. Poole).
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lations of the act but who refuse to do so, the Civil Rights Act
expressly pierced sanctuaries of local sovereignty and embraced
the use of federal judicial process against state officers who failed
to protect civil liberties. The provision, like the bulk of the entire
act, is thus anchored in a profound distrust of local officials. Were
the legislative history of section 1983 to be read as incorporating a
heavy dose of deference to state judicial process, it would, at a
minimum, be wildly out of step with the remainder of the statute.
The issue, of course, is not completely free from doubt. The section 1983 cause of action, for example, was not placed within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts-a step that would have
further expressed misgivings about local courts. But opponents of
the statute correctly saw concurrent state court jurisdiction as a
gesture based more in form than substance. Litigants asserting
federal rights, especially in the Reconstruction climate, would
hardly be likely to choose the state forum. 144 Some have argued as
well that because section one of the Civil Rights Act was so noncontroversial, it can be regarded as distinct from the tenor of the
remainder of the statute. 145 Emphasizing these factors, however,
goes against the overwhelming weight of the legislative evidence.
Section one was thought to provide no basis for objection because
it offered far less potential for national domination than the bulk
of its statutory counterparts. 146 Reading the provision as incorporating a deferential posture to local judges badly misses the forest
in favor of an isolated tree or two. Basic canons of statutory interpretation suggest that an act "is passed as a whole and not in parts
or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent." 147
No doubt the "general purpose and intent" of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 is to assert the national power to guarantee protection of
"any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
of the United States." To the extent that deference to local decisionmakers interferes with that mission, the statutory mandate
falls strongly on the side of federal intervention. 148
"' See, e.g., id. app. at 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); see also Theis, Res Judicata in
Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 859, 868 (1976)
("the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts was probably considered to be of little practical
importance").
,.. See Zagrans, supra note 62, at 548-60.
HI See 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 568 (remarks of Sen. Edmonds); id. at app. 68 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
7
H
2A J. Sutherland, supra note 78, § 46.05, at 90.
HI See Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the
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The legislative history of section 1983 clearly indicates that its
drafters were untroubled by such niceties as solicitude for local jurists. It is also clear, however, that this attitude was shaped by
their perceptions of emergency in the Reconstruction South. The
severity of the moment called for a remedy that was effective, not
deferential. But over a century later, the exigencies of Reconstruction no longer exist. If the draftsmen of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 could reasonably worry that state judges were in league with
the Ku Klux Klan, or fundamentally antithetical to civil liberties,
we need not. Accordingly, some have argued that section 1983
should be interpreted to take this change of circumstance into account.149 It seems doubtful, however, that change of condition
alone merits the judicial creation of a large exception to a broadly
phrased statutory mandate. Deciding when a regulatory scheme is
no longer needed is a particularly legislative function. The overt
judicial authority to modify or update archaic statutes remains, at
present, but a glimmer in Dean Calabresi's eye. 150
But our remove, constitutionally speaking, from 1871 is not so
easily dismissed. Change of circumstances is perhaps common to
all statutes-at least all old ones. And updating statutes to conform with the times should be done by legislatures, not courts. But
the degree of commitment to the federal Constitution exhibited by
state judges is not the only alteration the intervening century has
wrought. The "rights, privileges, and immunities" secured by the
United States Constitution-and thus the scope of section
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1985) (statute designed to
be part of a general pattern of federal supervision); see also F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The
Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System 64 (1928) ("Sensitiveness to 'states' rights' fear of rivalry with state courts and respect for state sentiment,
were swept aside by the great impulse of national feeling born of the Civil War.").
140
See, e.g., M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power
274 n.lOO (1980) (one possible reconciliation of Younger and Mitchum is that "while Congress' mistrust was justified in the 1870's, it no longer is today"); see also Wells, Why Professor Redish Is Wrong About Abstention, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 1097, 1098 (1985) ("the statute
was never intended to create such a broad cause of action").
0
'" See G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 176 (1982) (advocating a
general "doctrine of judicial sunset").
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1983-have undergone a massive transformation. The cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, therefore, has been subject to
more than mere changing times. The scope of the provision has
been so broadened that construing it in line with the framers' intent could threaten the dual judicial system.
Though section 1983 was designed as an extremely intrusive
tool, in comparative terms, its scope was exceedingly narrow. In
1871, the liberties assured by the constitution against the states
did not include, for example, the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
As a result, the typical practices of local criminal process did not
implicate federal guaranties. States could not violate the first
amendment's speech, press, or religion clauses. Decisions recognized no fundamental right to traveP 51 or vote/ 52 nor any right to
privacy. 153 The equal protection clause carried no weight outside
the race context,154 and precious little even there. 155 In short, none
of the cornerstones of our modern system of constitutional review
was yet in place. And this distinction is reflected in the legislative
history of section 1983.
The character of constitutional injury that the Civil Rights Act
sought to remedy was hardly subtle. As Congressman Coburn explained: "The arresting power is fettered, the witnesses are silenced, the courts are impotent, the laws are annulled, the criminal
goes free, and the persecuted citizen looks in vain for redress. " 156
Given the threatened outrage, the proponents of the statute
claimed a willingness "to go to the extreme verge of fair construction that will justify Federal intervention. " 157 But the harshness of
the exercise of power was tempered by the perceived ease of avoiding liability. As one supporter claimed, speaking of the statute as a
101

See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (declaring unconstitutional a one-year
residency requirement for state welfare program).
102
See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll tax).
10
' See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (declaring unconstitutional a limitation of
right to marry).
1
. . See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
100
The Slaughterhouse Cases envisioned little use for the equal protection clause outside
the racial discrimination context. See id. at 81; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896) (equal protection clause not violated by regime of separate-but-equal).
1
. . 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn).
107
See id. app. at 312 (remarks of Rep. Burchard); see also id. at 609 (remarks of Sen.
Poole) ("The reconstruction policy, by which the political and civil equality of all citizens is
made a constitutional right, is meant to be enforced as a measure of national safety.").
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whole: "Every man can escape the stringency of [the bill's] action
by remaining a quiet and peaceful citizen, and not infringing the
rights of person, property, or liberty of another . . . . " 158 Today,
with the tremendous expansion of the substantive scope of the federal Constitution brought about in the last several decades, any
local law enforcement official, public university president, state
agency administrator, school board member, prison warden, or
other government actor finds it considerably more difficult to
avoid the rigors of section 1983. But, as I argue below, state judges
are placed in a particularly exposed position. 159 In 1871, section
one of the Civil Rights Act could be violated primarily by the continued enforcement of some of the more egregious examples of
overtly racist legislation or, perhaps, by manipulating legal process
to harass blacks and Union sympathizers. A constitutional infraction by a local judge, therefore, was regarded as an intentional
flouting of federal authority. Now it may be no more than a
mistake.
In one sense, this tension between the concerns of the Reconstruction era and our own is a reflection of what Professor Eisenberg has characterized as "two competing visions of section
1983."160 As he puts it, in "one perspective, section 1983 addresses
a limited historical problem in post-Civil War race relations. In another, it is the primary civil mechanism for vindicating ... constitutional rights." 161 But if the section 1983 cause of action is not to
be limited to the particular evils that brought it into being-which
I argue below would be an inappropriate turn 162-the potential for
conflict between federal and state judiciaries under the "modern"
statute is markedly increased. The flowering of the incorporation
doctrine has resulted in the constitutionalization of a substantial
segment of the work of state courts. The demands of the fourth,
fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments play a predominant role in
state criminal process. The standards of procedural due process
and equal protection of the laws, to name but two obvious choices,
pervade local civil process. It is hardly the case, therefore, that a
1
1

""

""
180

Id. at 450 (remarks of Rep. Butler).
See infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
Eisenberg, Section 1983:. Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 Cornell L.

Rev. 482, 483 (1982).
181 Id.
182
See infra notes 165-79 and accompanying text.
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state jurist can with ease "escape the stringency" of section 1983
by not "infringing the rights of person, property, or liberty of another." A section 1983 cause of action that literally calls local
judges to task for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by Constitution and laws" of the United States is
much closer to a system of complete federal supervision over state
courts now than it would have been in the late nineteenth century.
If section 1983 were to be given its full intrusive power, the frictions resulting from federal supervision would be unmitigated by
protections from injunctive obstruction, immunities from damage
claims, and the respect afforded through collateral estoppel. Like it
or not, interference with even the good faith decisionmaking of
state courts under an expansive section 1983 would pose problems
that are potentially crippling to both judiciaries.
A. Addressing the Dilemma
Correctly interpreting section 1983 thus presents something of a
dilemma. The statute was intended to be intrusive. Yet the scope
of its original mission, at least if we tie it to the concerns of the
framers, was quite limited. As its purview has expanded to conform to the provision's language, the potential for interference
with local judicial process has expanded dramatically. If the section is applied with the full intrusive force that its drafters envisioned, complications that the framers would perhaps have rejected, or at least did not contemplate, arise.
There are a number of ways one might propose to deal with the
dilemma. The first, and probably the least satisfactory, is the tack
the Supreme Court has chosen. The Court's decisions on section
1983 and state courts163 deal with the tensions of section 1983 interpretation by pretending that they do not exist. When the Justices opt for intervention, they cite passages of legislative history
to support federal intrusion. When deference carries the day, opinions typically maintain that "nothing in the legislative history of
section 1983" demands a contrary conclusion. 164 Even if the results
of the various decisions can be supported on one ground or an113

See supra notes 25-76 and accompanying text.
,.. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980). This point is made effectively in Wells, The
Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation to Common
Law Rules, 19 Conn. L. Rev. 53, 60-68 (1986).
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other, the methodology is indefensible.
The claim that the scope of section 1983 should be tied to its
origins is more plausible. This argument has two principal variants. The first is that Mitchum v. Foster and, by implication, Pulliam and Monroe were wrongly decided. Those cases, authorizing
strong federal intervention, cannot be supported, because the
framers of the 1871 Civil Rights Act sought to remedy a very specific and dramatic evil-racial suppression in the South. To root
the modern section 1983 cause of action, which is the conduit for a
broad system of constitutional adjudication, in an emergency Reconstruction measure is erroneous. The tension between the broadened scope of the statute and the intrusive nature of its original
design is thus cured by returning the Act to its earlier confines. 165
The second claim is closely related to the first. If the legislative
history of section 1983 demonstrates that it was designed to be
strongly interventionist, its full power should be reserved for the
circumstances the framers had in mind-actions alleging racial discrimination. Accordingly, section 1983 litigation would develop
along two tiers. In race cases, no deference to local judicial officers
would be afforded. In the great bulk of other disputes now falling
under section 1983's broad mantle, traditional solicitude for state
government actors would be mandated. 166
The primary shortcoming of these suggested alterations, of
course, is the language of the statute. Section 1983 unambiguously
affords relief for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im••• This is perhaps the simplest way to categorize a recent article by Professor Zagrans
calling for an extremely cramped interpretation of the "under color of law" requirement.
See Zagrans, supra note 62. Professor Zagrans argues that the framers of § 1983 sought to
reach only actions demanded or authorized by unconstitutional state law. Accordingly, he
claims that Monroe was wrongly decided. The "under color" requirement applies, in his
view, only to the enforcement of statutes that require unconstitutional behavior, specifically
allow unconstitutional behavior, or grant unlimited powers to state actors who then proceed
to inflict deprivations of constitutional rights.
In my view, Zagrans dramatically underplays one of the central premises of § 1983-distrust of local judiciaries. His conclusion that the actions of judicial officers are cognizable
under § 1983 I accept, but find inconsistent with his central premises. Moreover, I think
that any interpretation of the Ku Klux Act that leaves the actions of the Ku Klux Klan
unregulated-as Zagrans' would-should be rejected out of hand.
Professor Currie, writing that "there was no excuse for the Mitchum decision," has argued
that Mitchum was wrongly decided. Currie, supra note 28, at 329. His position, however,
turns on his reading of the appropriate contours of the Anti-Injunction Act. See id.
166
See Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 485.
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munities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United
States. The text of the statute thus provides an insurmountable
barrier to at least the stronger of the two claims. The scope of the
rights embraced by the Act could simply not be clearer. "Reasonably well-informed people"~ 67 could hardly conclude, from the language of the statute alone, that the evils addressed are limited to
race discrimination. As a result, the legislation must be "held to
mean what it plainly expresses."168 Moreover, if the scope of section 1983 were to be dramatically reduced, a new set of even more
intractable problems would result. Without the benefit of the spaciously worded statute, the federal courts would be forced to develop a body of decisions outlining the causes of action against
state actors created directly by the fourteenth amendment. At the
federal level, this has proven to be a particularly thorny problem. 169 The confusion should be compounded only as a last resort.
The two-tiered approach at least conflicts less dramatically with
the wording of the Act. Under its premises the scope of section
1983 would be unchanged. Only in cases of "racial [discrimination]
and Klan . . . violence"~ 70 would the full intrusion of federal power
be employed. 171 An accommodation of sorts is thus achieved between the broad terms of the Act and a legislative history that
calls for strong federal intervention. Of course, tension with the
language of the Civil Rights Act remains. The provision suggests
no hierarchy of rights. The phrase "deprivation of any rights," in
fact, seems to represent the strongest declaration possible to the
contrary. Functionally, the two-tiered methodology would leave
the section 1983 cause of action out of step with the fourteenth
2A J. Sutherland, supra note 78, § 46.04, at 87.
Id. § 46.01, at 73.
100
The line of decisions launched by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), has been a troubled one. Not the least of its
problems has been the determination of whether the rulings are constitutional or statutory
in nature. Compare Bivens (Constitution supports a private cause of action) with Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (capacity of courts to award damages stems from federal courts'
statutory jurisdiction).
170
Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 485 (emphasizing the 1871 Act's concern with specific
race-based problems and arguing that applications of § 1983 beyond that context must
"seek justification in something more than the intent of section 1983's framers").
171
Eisenberg argues that although the 1871 Act dealt with a "limited problem," its history nonetheless "suggests a firm congressional resolve that the problem feel the full effect
of federal power." Id.
107
100
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amendment-the provision it was primarily designed to enforce.172
No doubt we are far removed from the time when that amendment's protections provided special scrutiny only for claims of racial inequality.173 Ultimately even this strategy suffers from a failing more familiar to the most rigid originalist doctrines of
constitutional interpretation. 174 Section 1983, like the fourteenth
amendment itself, embraces a principle that is substantially
broader than the evils that brought it into being. 175
There is also a significant practical problem with a two-tiered
vision of section 1983. Commentators have rather easily characterized the core concern of the statute as race discrimination. 176 The
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, however, indicates that
the provision is not so easily cabined. No doubt protecting the
newly freed slaves from the abuses of hostile southerners was a
central goal of the 1871 statute. The Congressional Globe also
reveals, however, a related and substantial concern for the plight of
Republicans and Unionists. As Senator Pratt complained, for example, redress in the state courts "only fail[s] . . . when a man of
known Union sentiments, white or black, invokes their aid.m 77 The
hearings that preceded the passage of the Act "demonstrated that
the Negro was not alone in his tribulations; white persons who had
supported the Union cause or who were bold enough to advocate
civil rights for the Negro were also the victims of terrorism in the
South."178 Any core of section 1983 defined by the circumstances
that led to the statute's passage, then, would need to encompass a
broader universe than racial injustice. "Causal" wrongs include, at
a minimum, manipulation of legal process to punish political opposition, to suppress freedom of speech, and apparently, to discour-

112
See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); see also 42 Globe, supra note 31, at
375-76 (remarks of Rep. Lowe) ("Is not this appropriate legislation to enforce the provisions
of the [fourteenth amendment]?").
113
This point is made quite vividly in Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 292-99 (1978).
114
See, e.g., R. Berger, Government by Judiciary 37-134 (1977)_
116
See generally R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 46-50 (1985) (indicating that "abstract" intent of framers of fourteenth amendment may have been broader than concrete
problems the amendment addressed).
118
See Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 485-86.
,.,., 42 Globe, supra note 31, at 505.
116
Gressman, supra note 91, at 1329-30.
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age the exercise of the right to traveP 79 But once that door is
opened, the effort to define the heart of the expansive provision is
lost.
It has also been suggested that the friction between section
1983's intrusive intention and its modern scope should lead to a
very different conclusion-that the legislative history of the statute is no longer relevant to its appropriate interpretation.180 To
any reader of the Supreme Court's section 1983 decisions, this proposal carries obvious appeal. At a minimum, it calls for the end of
the inconsistent and haphazard use of legislative intent. It also recognizes that judicial opinions have on occasion attributed more to
the framers of the Civil Rights Act than their century-old deliberations can reasonably be asked to bear. The Supreme Court's flipflop on the applicability of the statute to municipalities provides a
ready example. 181 If governmental entities carrying out the responsibilities and exercising the prerogatives of modern cities did not
meaningfully exist at the local level in 1871, it is hardly fruitful to
scour the debates in search of references to municipalities. 182 The
drafters' intentions are simply unhelpful on many of the issues of
modern section 1983 jurisprudence.
Courts should be reluctant, however, to disregard the intention
of the statute's proponents when it is both ascertainable and capable of being carried forward under our existing litigation framework. Rejecting legislative intent in favor of a complete system of
17
° Consider, for example, the remarks of Rep. Platt: "[N]o Republican white or black,
especially if he is a citizen who has come here from another State[,] ... can secure as
plaintiff or defendant anything like equal justice before the courts of the State." 42 Globe,
supra note 31, app. at 185.
180
See Wells, supra note 164, at 68. I do agree, however, that the legislative intention of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 simply does not speak to a great number of modern § 1983
issues. See generally Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the
Court's Historical Analysis, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 741 (1987) (criticizing the Court's use of history
in § 1983 cases).
181
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), ruled that municipalities were not "persons" for
purposes of § 1983. That determination was reversed in Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See generally Snyder, The Final Authority Analysis: A Unified
Approach to Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 633 (offering a
method of interpreting the "policy or custom" requirement established in Monell); Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 225, 230-38
(1986) (discussing Monell's overruling Monroe).
181
See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-66 (1981) (relevance
of original intent of § 1983 to question of punitive damage awards against municipalities).
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common law development poses several problems. First, section
1983 does not furnish the apparent textual warrant to construct
judicially a set of freestanding principles for decision of the sort
that some other federal statutes have been held to provide. Section
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 183 for example, has
been determined to authorize "federal courts to fashion a body of
federal law for the enforcement of . . . collective bargaining agreements."184 But 42 U.S.C. § 1988 indicates that in cases under the
Civil Rights Act "the laws of the United States," or, if they are
"deficient," the "common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the . . . cause is
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States" shall apply. 185 Section 1988 has
hardly proven a model of clarity. 186 It does at least indicate that
judges, in measuring the demands of section 1983, are not simply
to make it up as they go.
A freewheeling common law process poses legitimacy dangers
from the other direction as well. If judge-made section 1983 standards result in a more restrictive cause of action than the framers
contemplated, the judiciary apparently usurps legislative mandate.
Mitchum, for example, declares that the Civil Rights Act was
designed to afford injunctive relief against state judiciaries.
Younger largely takes away what Mitchum grants. If we are to
characterize Younger as an exercise in common law decisionmaking, it is hard to comprehend the judicial warrant for rejecting, as
Professor Redish has put it, "the product of the congressional balancing process"187 reflected in section 1983.
This point hints at yet a third approach to the interpretation of
section 1983. Under this theory, the courts should allow both the
intrusive design of the statute and its expansive modern scope to
be given full play. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
29 u.s.c. § 185 (1982).
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
185
42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1982).
188
The relevance of § 1988 to the determination of § 1983 damages, for example, has
proven to be complex. See, e.g., Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
187
Redish, supra note 22, at 88 (1984). But see Bator, The State Courts and Federal
Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 605, 622 n.49 (1981) (concluding that
Younger "should not be criticized as an act of judicial usurpation").
183
184

Section 1983

1987]

993

demands that the statute be read to penetrate traditional concepts
of state sovereignty. The language of the provision, meanwhile, requires that it be applied broadly. This analysis leads Professor
Redish to claim that Younger v. Harris is illegitimate "judicial
lawmaking of the most sweeping nature."~ 88 Younger's premise,
Redish correctly indicates, "rests largely on the desire to avoid insulting state judiciaries by questioning their competence or good
faith." 189 Given Mitchum's ruling that section 1983 was designed
to provide injunctive relief against distrusted state courts, however, Congress appears to have left little room for a contrary judicial conclusion.
Professor Redish's logic is unassailable. The problem with his
position, however, flows from carrying his premises to their natural
conclusion. It is true that Mitchum calls into question Younger's
legitimacy. But for exactly the same reasons, Mitchum and the legislative history of section 1983 cast doubt on Allen v. McCurry and
Pierson v. Ray. And, as I shall argue below, a section 1983 cause of
action that provides federal relief for the "deprivation of any
rights" at the hands of state judges without the implementation of
immunities, freedom from injunctive interference, or the safeguard
of collateral bar would necessarily result in a debilitating clash between the two judicial systems. If this claim is true, then there are
reasons apart from sheer judicial willfulness to interpret section
1983 to avoid such friction.
B.

Section 1983 and Deference to State Courts

A number of conclusions may be drawn on the basis of this reading of the legislative history of section 1983. First, regardless of the
intricacies of proper interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act,
Mitchum's conclusion that the framers of the Civil Rights Act
would have authorized equitable relief against state courts is correct. Second, the 1871 Congress had grave misgivings about the reliability of state court process. It is very unlikely, therefore, that
the statute's proponents would have considered the possibility of
presenting a constitutional defense to the state courts an appropriate substitute for a section 1983 cause of action. Younger, as are'" Redish, supra note 22, at 114.
••• Id. at 87.
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suit, seems to be at odds with legislative intention. Third, state
courts played a central role in the evil the Civil Rights Act was
designed to abate. Given the broad language of the statute, it is
very difficult to make a case based on framers' design for Pierson's
grant of absolute judicial immunity from damage claims.190 Nor,
for that matter, would the 1871 Congress have been likely to demand the exhaustion of state remedies or to apply principles of
collateral estoppel to limit the issues cognizable under section
1983. In short, the circumstances of the Civil Rights Act's passage
lead reasonably to its characterization as a fully intrusive assertion
of federal power, designed to ensure the protection of basic civil
liberties even at the cost of displacing, and offending, traditional
state prerogatives. Mitchum, Pulliam, and at least the nonexhaustion rule of Monroe, 191 therefore, are supported by the intent of
section 1983's drafters. Younger, Pierson, and McCurry are not.
The inquiry, however, cannot stop there. Given the tremendous
expansion in substantive scope that the "rights, privileges, and immunities" protected by the statute have undergone in the past
three decades, a fully intrusive section 1983 would lead to ramifications unforeseen in 1871. The gradual constitutionalization of a
substantial portion of the state judicial process has led to a considerable overlap, and thus to considerable opportunity for friction,
between the two court systems. Consider a simple example.
Suppose that a Virginian is indicted in the courts of his state for
possession of cocaine. In his defense, along with declaring his inno190

I think, therefore, that the Third Circuit correctly read the legislative design of the
Civil Rights Act in the 1945 decision Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir.
1945), rejecting judicial immunity under § 1983:
[T]he privilege was ... a rule of the common law. Congress possessed the power to
wipe it out. We think that the conclusion is irresistible that Congress by enacting the
Civil Rights Act . . . intended to abrogate the privilege to the extent indicated by
that act and in fact did so. Section 1 of the . . . Civil Rights Act explicitly applied to
'any person.'... We can imagine no broader definition. The statute must be deemed
to include members of the state judiciary acting in official capacity.
Id. at 250.
I argue below, however, that where necessity, rather than intent, is at issue, immunity can
be justified. See infra notes 194-203 and accompanying text.
191
As I have said, it is not my intent to defend Monroe v. Pape's broad interpretation of
the under color of law requirement. Nor is the appropriate scope of the under color standard
central to my claims. See supra note 165. I do contend, however, that Justice Douglas was
correct in concluding that the framers of § 1983 were reluctant to relegate the victims of
southern abuses to the vagaries of state judicial process.
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cence, he claims that the drugs were the subject of an unreasonable
search, that a statement was introduced against him in violation of
his Miranda rights, and that his right to confront his accusers was
breached by the admission of certain hearsay testimony. The motions he files to present the challenges are denied in both pretrial
and trial rulings. Eventually, he is convicted. If the section 1983
cause of action provides the strongly interventionist remedy the
framers probably intended, the defendant's federal options are
numerous.
As soon as the state judge denies his pretrial motions to suppress, he could move to the federal forum seeking an injunction to
stop the state prosecution. 192 The claim could easily be made that
the trial judge is a "person" acting "under color of' state law who
has deprived the new federal plaintiff of a right secured by the
Constitution of the United States. As Mitchum suggests, injunctive
relief against a state tribunal is envisioned by section 1983. Nor
would Younger stand as a bar to interference with the local prosecution: the legislative history of section 1983 offers strong rebuttal
to the assertion that the framers of the statute would have considered the possibility of presenting a constitutional defense to the
state court an adequate remedy at law. 193
If the criminal defendant should choose to wait until he is convicted to seek federal relief, he might again find a hospitable forum. After final judgment, a section 1983 damages action could be
filed against the convicting judge. Alleging wrongful admission of
••• It could be argued at this point that no "deprivation" has occurred for purposes of
§ 1983 until conviction. Once a conviction has been obtained, of course, the habeas corpus
statute-rather than § 1983-takes over. It is unclear to me, however, why the very use of a
coerced confession or the fruits of an illegal search, or why forcing a defendant to be tried
without counsel, for example, does not amount to a deprivation under the Civil Rights Act.
If the defendant were subsequently acquitted and if judges did not enjoy immunity, I would
think that a cause of action for such constitutional violations could be had pursuant to
§ 1983.
The potential liability for damage claims arising from the applicability of § 1983 to state
court processes is immense. If the disappointed state court litigant seeks to challenge the
underlying state court conviction, however, the cause of action would lie under, and be governed by, the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). See generally Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-99 (1973) (holding writ of habeas corpus appropriate remedy
for prisoners claiming unconstitutional prolongation of prison term).
,.. See Redish, supra note 22, at 186 ("[T]he drafters of section 1983 were especially concerned with the good faith of the state courts, [and] it is unlikely that they assumed that
the ability to raise a federal defense in state court constituted an adequate remedy.").
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the evidence contested under the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments, the new plaintiff could seek actual and punitive damages,
as well as attorney's fees. Pierson would no longer stand as a bar to
retroactive monetary claims because it is inconsistent with the language and intent of section 1983. Of course, the constitutional issues would have been given a full and complete airing in the convicting court. The rejection of the constitutional defenses by the
local judge, however, would carry no weight in the federal tribunal.
McCurry's determination that collateral estoppel applies to civil
rights actions cannot be squared with the framers' distrust of state
judiciaries. Accordingly, the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment issues would be retried in the federal suit. If the federal district
court disagreed with the local judge's disposition, an award of
damages and attorney's fees would be mandated.
Under a fully intrusive version of section 1983, this hypothetical
scenario would hardly be aberrant. Theoretically, this ping-pong
adjudication could transpire daily in every jurisdiction in the nation, at least until both judicial systems broke under the pressure.
Section 1983, if given both its complete scope and its full mandate
of intervention, would serve to extinguish the separate existence of
the state courts and massively overburden the federal courts. Such
a result would hardly be the product of reasoned statutory
construction.
It is hard to disagree with the claim that a piece of remedial
legislation like section 1983 should be "construe[d] in such a way
as to make it a more rather than a less effective cure"~ 94 for the ills
it set about to address. In the broadest terms, section 1983 was
designed to provide a federal cause of action that assures state
constitutional compliance. It is certainly possible, however, that if
the statute is interpreted in too intrusive a fashion, the final result
would be a remedy that is less rather than more effective. The easiest example is the question of judicial immunity. It is certainly
plausible that a state judge would be debilitated from carrying out
her appointed tasks if she should be adjudged liable for damages,
without benefit of immunity, for any deprivation of constitutional
rights resulting from her actions. The sheer volume of "constitutional" decisions made by trial courts, especially criminal trial
194
R. Posner, supra note 124, 278 (discussing the canon of construction that remedial
statutes should be read broadly).
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courts, would engender a level of risk that even the most learned,
and the most solvent, jurist would fmd unacceptable. In addition,
the flood of section 1983 claims would likely overwhelm the federal
docket, thus impeding those with serious constitutional claims
from obtaining swift redress through the federal courts. Is it possible to conclude, therefore, that regardless of the designs of the
framers, section 1983 can be read to embrace an absolute immunity for state judges?
Curiously, it may be that a body of decisions interpreting the
provisions of an antitrust statute is instructive. The Sherman Act
provides that "every contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce ... is ... illegal."~ 911 But as Justice Brandeis pointed out in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, "every agreement concerning trade . . . restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very
essence."196 If a buyer closes a deal with a seller, the contract ties
both to a particular course, limiting options and restraining the efforts of others who might offer different bargains. Surely, the argument goes, the Sherman Act does not render all contracts that affect interstate commerce illegal. Accordingly, "some mode of
confining the generality of the language" of the act must be
sought. 197 To that end, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States/ 98 the
Supreme Court announced that the Sherman Act would be interpreted pursuant to a "Rule of Reason," forbidding only contracts
that constitute "undue restraint[s]" of trade. 199
The majority position in Standard Oil was not achieved without
a fight. The first Justice Harlan dissented vehemently, proclaiming
that the opinion of the Court "may well cause some alarm for the
integrity of our institutions."200 It was his position that the adoption of the "Rule of Reason" was nothing more than "judicial legislation"; it altered the Sherman Act with an "exception" that was
"not placed there by the lawmaking branch of the Government."201
The statute, in short, says every contract in restraint of trade, not
only unreasonable ones.
•••
•••
•••
•••
•••
200
201

15 u.s.c. § 1 (1982) •
246 u.s. 231, 238 (1918).
L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 165 (1977) •
221 u.s. 1 (1911).
Id. at 60.
Id. at 83 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 88.
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Of course, Chief Justice White's opinion, the majority opinion in
Standard Oil, has carried the day. And its theory is useful in addressing the dilemma presented by the disjunction between section
1983's genesis and its modern application. Standard Oil suggests
that the Sherman Act cannot be read to proscribe every contract
because it simply would not work. The statute's drafters could not
have intended for such a result to transpire. Or if they did, they
clearly failed to think the problem through. A statute should not
be interpreted in a manner that will render it impossible to carry
out.
If we focus for the moment on the question of judicial immunity
from damage claims under section 1983, it is possible to see the
problem in a similar light. The Civil Rights Act applies, by its
terms, to "every person." Judges are persons. The legislative history of the provision, if anything, actually bolsters the claim that
no immunities for judges were contemplated. Thus both the statute and its legislative circumstances suggest full judicial liability.
Yet surrounding circumstances, as well as the scope of section
1983, have changed. But these changes have not merely rendered
the statute less useful or necessary. Rather, the Civil Rights Act,
like the Sherman Act, cannot be interpreted in accord with its language. It simply will not work. It might well have been possible in
1871 to hold state judges fully accountable under section one of the
Civil Rights Act. Without an incorporated Bill of Rights and invigorated substantive visions of the various clauses of the fourteenth
amendment, a state judge could perhaps have conscientiously performed his duties without the paralyzing specter of threatened federal damage claims. Very likely, however, that is no longer the
case. State adjudication involves the determination of too many
constitutional questions, too many potential deprivations. A cautious, or perhaps wise, judge would, at the least, steer far clear of
deciding any constitutional issues against a criminal defendant.
Her pocketbook would be threatened only if she erred on behalf of
the state. It is possible, one might counter, that local judges could
survive under a mere qualified immunity-thus the case I make is
overstated. But that only moves the debate back a step. The language and history of section 1983 support no judicial immunities,
no matter what their degree. The recognition of any shield for
state courts, strong or weak, results from necessity, not intention.
But the necessity is real. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude
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that section 1983 should be read to countenance judicial immunity
so that the statute remains possible to effectuate. By embracing
immunity, the statute is construed "to make it a more rather than
less effective" tool of constitutional supervision.
This methodology suggests a model for the interpretation of section 1983 as it applies to state courts.202 The language and history
of the Act imply full accountability, both in law and in equity, for
state judges. Because the statute provides no grant of authority to
create a common law of federal-state judicial relations, especially a
common law that is at odds with the terminology and design of the
statute, the full breadth of federal supervision countenanced by
the Act should, as a general matter, be exercised. Given the dramatically increased opportunities for friction between state and
federal courts that result from the modern expansion of constitutional decisionmaking, however, it is necessary to incorporate some
key aspects of deference to local judiciaries into the section 1983
cause of action regardless of the attitudes of the framers. The "exceptions" to section 1983's regime of supervision should thus be
measured by necessity. Deferential rules should be adopted only if
the application of the statute's intrusive original design would
render it a less effective tool of constitutional enforcement by
debilitating state judicial actors or overwhelming federal oversight
capacity.
There would be several advantages to such an approach. First, it
would pay continued respect to the language and mission of the
Civil Rights Act. Legitimacy questions that arise from the unexplained recoguition of limitations on section 1983 liability-typified by cases like Younger and Pierson-would be miti202
I realize that the arguments put forth here may have relevance beyond the determination of the appropriate relationships between state and federal courts under § 1983. The
claims I make for judicial immunity, for example, could support findings of legislative and
executive immunity as well. Those issues, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
Professor Matasar has recently criticized the Supreme Court's use of history in the personal
immunity cases. See Matasar, supra note 180. In his view, the immunity rulings underestimate the common law's attempts to mitigate immunity by expanding forms of compensatory relief as well as the "fundamental reordering" undertaken by the Reconstruction Congress. Id. at 179. Obviously, much of my effort here supports Matasar's claim-at least with
regard to judicial immunity. On that score, as indicated, I disagree with his assertion that
"history is so contextual ... [and] multi-leveled" as to he of little use in measuring § 1983
claims. Id. at 785. It is essential, of course, to determine whether judges come within
§ 1983's "any person" terminology. I have attempted to show here that the case for inclusion, as a matter of legislative intention, is ascertainable with reasonable certainty.
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gated.203 Judicial decisions could recognize and implement one
consistent, rather than two diametrically inconsistent, visions of
the legislative history of section 1983. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the debate over whether to afford deference to local
courts would be altered. In making the determination to embrace
injunctive oversight, to allow the estoppel of claims, or to recognize
immunities, for example, the decisive factor would be the necessity
that such protections be provided for state tribunals. The harms
resulting from federal intrusion would be made an overt, and
largely determinative, aspect of the section 1983 decisionmaking
process. And only if a clear and compelling case for state protection, one rooted in necessity, were made, would a departure from
section 1983's mandate be called for.

C. Application
The series of Supreme Court decisions that set the present contours of the relation between section 1983 and state courts204
would, at least in some particulars, receive different treatment
under the interpretive strategy suggested above. Mitchum, as already noted, provides an essentially accurate vision of section
1983's legislative intent.2011 The Civil Rights Act was designed, at
203
If, for example, judicial immunity were recognized under such a methodology, it would
be accomplished clearly as a matter of statutory interpretation. The determination would
not be plagued, as Pierson is, by a faulty reading of legislative intent. The interpretation,
recognizing limits born of necessity, could arguably be seen as incorrect. It would not, however, be subject to the claims of illegitimacy that Professor Redish has lodged, for example,
against the Younger doctrine. See Redish, supra note 22, at 86-87. The judgment could also
be overturned by Congress.
204
See supra notes 25-76 and accompanying text.
••• It is less clear, as I have said, that Mitchum is an appropriate reading of the AntiInjunction Act. Professor Currie, for example, considers the decision clearly wrong in its
determination that § 1983 is an "express" exception to § 2283. See Currie, supra note 28, at
329. It is not my primary goal here to consider the rigors of the Anti-Injunction Act. If
Mitchum is wrong on that issue, however, Younger becomes irrelevant. Professor Redish has
suggested an "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the statute that would achieve many of the
same results as Mitchum. See M. Redish, supra note 5, at 285-90.
To my mind, Mitchum can survive in result, even if its methodology is too sweeping, as an
express exception. Given the ambiguous nature of the injunctive prohibition as of 1871, it is
not surprising that the Reconstruction Congress did not expressly characterize the Civil
Rights Act as an exception to a general prohibition against injunctive interference. See the
discussion of the modern Anti-Injunction Act's predecessors in M. Redish, supra note 5, at
260-62. It is also true, as I have argued, that the framers of § 1983 meant to afford litigants
an equitable claim against state jurists. At the least, then, Mitchum is correct in its conclu-
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least in part, to afford injunctive relief against state jurists. Nor
can the demands for independence by state courts justify a total
proscription of equitable intervention. Certainly patterns of harassment, systematic constitutional abridgements, or dramatically
erroneous interpretations of federal law can be envisioned that
mandate federal intrusion, and yet pose no overwhelming dangers
to state judiciaries.206 As a result, a section 1983 methodology that
gives credence to original intention, tempered by the essential demands of local judicial prerogative, would reject an across the
board no-injunction rule.
Monroe's principle of nonexhaustion is even more easily justified. The historical case against exhaustion of judicial remedies is
very strong.207 Intrusion upon local process, on the other hand, is
minimal and indirect. At the other end of the spectrum, Pierson
presents an undeniable argument for deference. Accordingly, I
think that in ruling that state judges are absolutely immune from
damages, the Supreme Court made the right decision-but for the
wrong reason. Judicial immunity should be recognized under section 1983 not because the framers contemplated it, but because local judiciaries would be crippled without it.208
Pulliam, the recent decision refusing to apply the Pierson rule to
actions for prospective relief against state jurists, initially appears
to conform to the approach I suggest. The decision, however,
strikes me as more complex. I start from the premise that the
sion that the right to redress created by the Civil Rights Act of 1871 cannot be given its full
scope without recognizing an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. The "express" language
of the 1948 revision of the Anti-Injunction Act, if applied with stringency, results in something of a repeal by implication of § 1983. It seems unlikely that this is what the 1948
Congress intended, especially given the moribund state of the § 1983 cause of action at that
time. The statute does declare a right to equitable relief for the deprivation of constitutional
rights at the hands of every person. This language, combined with the strong legislative
history upon which Mitchum only incompletely draws, should be enough to escape the ban
of§ 2283.
208
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), for example, is such a case. Dombrowski
was based on allegations that state court prosecutions were made not "with any expectation
of securing valid convictions, but rather [as] part of a plan ... to harass and discourage
[plaintiffs] ... from asserting and attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of Negro citizens of Louisiana." Id. at 482; see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (pattern of discriminatory actions by state courts).
••• See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
••• See generally Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980
Duke L.J. 879 (addressing the importance to the appellate system of judical immunity).
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draftsmen of the Civil Rights Act envisioned no judicial immunity.
And, as the Court has recognized in other contexts, prospective
remedies tend to prove considerably less debilitating than the possibility of looming damage actions. 209 As I have just claimed, it is
difficult to justify a complete ban on injunctive intervention. Yet
something troubles me about a ruling that a successful action for
an injunction against a state judge can be accompanied by an
award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.210 To my mind,
Justice Powell's claim in dissent is difficult to counter: "[T]he
availability of injunctive relief under § 1983, combined with the
prospect of attorney's fees under § 1988, poses [a] serious threat of
harassing litigation with ... potentially adverse consequences for
judicial independence."211 It may well be, as the majority concluded,212 that Pulliam's result is compelled by the clear intention
of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. 213 As a
matter of section 1983 interpretation, however, the threat of a fee
award can intimidate as easily as the threat of a damage claim.
Under the interpretive scheme I propose, Younger v. Harris
takes on something of a different cast. It seems clear that the "national policy" on which "Our Federalism" is based was rejected by
the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Had they been acting
according to its dictates, one doubts that the section 1983 cause of
action would have been deemed necessary. Nor, for that matter,
would they have been apt to violate traditions of state sovereignty
so rudely by authorizing the employment of the national militia or
the suspension of habeas corpus. The tenor of the debates over sec209

Compare, for example, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (absolute immunity for
president from damage claims) with United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (president
subject to at least some forms of prospective relieO.
210
See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 544 (1984).
211
ld. at 557 (Powell, J., dissenting).
212
See id. at 543-44.
213
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). It remains to be asked, of course, why I would not apply a
"rule of necessity" to § 1988 as well as § 1983. First, it seems to me that some deference to
state judicial process is necessary not only to ensure that those processes are workable, but
also to foster the general purposes of constitutional compliance reflected in § 1983 itself.
The same argument is tougher to make for § 1988-granting an attorney's fee award against
state jurists embraces rather than threatens the goals of § 1988. Second, and more practically, a recent and pointed enactment like § 1988-if modified by the judiciary-obviously
poses greater separation of powers problems. If the attorney's fees provision burdens state
court judges, and if, as the Pulliam Court held, Congress meant to impose such liability, it is
properly left to Congress to cure the problem.
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tions one and two of the Act also engenders a firm conviction that
the forty-second Congress would have spurned the notion that the
opportunity to present a federal defense to a state court constitutes an adequate remedy at law, thus precluding section 1983 relief. The essential premises underlying Younger, therefore, are at
odds with the language and legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act. 214
At least some aspects of the intrusiveness claim that justifies
Pierson, however, are relevant to Younger. Direct injunctions
against state court process can obviously be highly disruptive. Not
only are proceedings interrupted midstream, but the state judicial
system is subjected to an inference that it cannot be trusted to run
••• Professor Bator has sought justification for Younger in traditional equity doctrine.
"[I]t seems to me implausible to assume that the cause of action created by ... the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 [was] meant wholly to supersede the preexisting equity doctrine that a
good faith criminal prosecution will not ordinarily be enjoined simply because the plaintiff
asserts that he has a valid defense to it." Bator, supra note 187, at 622 n.49.
There are two types of responses to Professor Bator's claim. First, the modern Younger
doctrine does not represent "pre-existing equity doctrine." Professor Redish has argued, for
example, that the development of principles of equitable restraint took place within a unitary court system-where one constituent part must obviously be reluctant to supersede
another. See Redish, supra note 22, at 85. Other commentators have argued that the
Younger principle actually works to remove equitable discretion. It is a "single, rigid commandment of federal judicial inaction that violates even such rules as equity and comity
could be said to have contained." Soifer & Macgill, supra note 22, at 1143; see also Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n.22 (1976) ("where a
case is properly within [the scope of the Younger doctrine], there is no discretion to grant
injunctive relief').
Moreover, as Professor Laycock has shown, Younger moves beyond equitable doctrine in
other ways. A federal injunction against state court process was said in Younger to demand
not only "irreparable," but "great and immediate" injury. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,46
(1971). Traditionally, a legal remedy has been deemed "adequate" only if it is as "complete,
practical and efficient as that which equity could afford." Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S.
197, 214 (1923). But, as Professor Laycock bas shown, "[t]hree important powers of equity
courts are not available to criminal courts in Anglo-American jurisprudence: the power to
give interlocutory relief, the power to give prospective relief, and the power to give class
relief." Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective
Relief, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193, 199. The Supreme Court has been essentially unconcerned
with the actual adequacy of relief state process affords in the Younger cases because the
doctrine is one of federalism, not equity.
I would add a second argument to these claims. After a review of the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act, I find it entirely "plausible" that the framers would have rejected any
equitable doctrine that incorporated as its working premise an assumption that state courts
will evenhandedly apply the law. State tribunals afford an adequate remedy at law only if
they fairly and systematically enforce federal interests. The framers of § 1983 thought state
courts fell far short of that mark.
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its course. Granted, this "insult" to state jurists and the costs of
possible obstruction of state proceedings were perceived by the
framers of section 1983,215 but were thought to be outweighed by
the need to further state constitutional compliance. Still, the opportunities and the obligations of federal injunctive oversight of
state process are dramatically expanded under the modern section
1983 cause of action. From the state courts' viewpoint, federal interference is perhaps less daunting than potential liability for damage claims. At least injunctions operate prospectively, and compliance, even if reluctant, can be achieved. But the possibility of
federal intervention as the result of "any deprivation" sustained at
the hands of state courts would be debilitating both for the federal
intruder and the local victim of national supervision.216
The Younger question seems to turn, therefore, on the extent to
which the normal requisites for equitable relief should be bolstered
by the requirement of deference to state courts. Justice Black concluded that federal interference ought to be barred unless the state
case is brought in "bad faith," or pursuant to a statute "flagrantly
and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in
every clause, sentence and paragraph." 217 The bad faith or harassment exception, with its apparent demand for ill-motivated or repeated prosecutions,218 surely poses no great threat to state judicial
215
Congressman Storm, for example, claimed that the bill "does not even give the State
courts a chance. . . ." 42 Globe, supra note 31, app. at 86. Congressman Holman asserted
that "the jurisdiction of the federal courts . . . is to invade the provinces of the State courts
with new laws and systems of administration." Id. at 258. Congressman Arthur stated that
"[h]aving swallowed up the States and their institutions, tribunals, and functions, [the Act]
leaves them the shadow of what they once were." Id. at 365.
218
A variety of justifications have been offered for the Younger doctrine of deference:
avoiding interference with state substantive goals, the desire to preserve the discretion of
state executive officers, avoiding insult to the competence of state courts, and preventing
interference with the orderly functioning of state judicial process. See Redish, The Doctrine
of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 463, 465-66
(1978). The first two of these are directly at odds, given a showing of unconstitutionality,
with the goals of § 1983. I have indicated as well that the "insult" implicit in the shift of
power to the federal judiciary accomplished by the 1871 Act was certainly contemplated by
the framers. I agree, then, with Professor Redish that the "strongest justification for
Younger ... is the recognized need to avoid disrupting the state judicial process." Id. at
484. I recognize that the framers of § 1983 envisioned disruption of state court process. But
the magnitude of disruption a modern, intrusive §1983 cause of action would visit on state
courts is far beyond their contemplation.
217
Younger, 401 U.S. at 53 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).
218
Id. at 49-53. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975), suggests that "bad faith"
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independence. For purposes of section 1983 jurisprudence, however, the "flagrantly and patently violative" standard is of greater
interest.
Given the central premise of the Younger decision-trustworthiness of state judicial decisionmaking-the patently violative exception is anomalous. Surely if state judges can be trusted, they can
be trusted to handle the most clear-cut cases. And if the deferential doctrine is based on an unwillingness to assume the worst
about state courts, why construct an exception that anticipates
that judges might intentionally violate the Constitution's demands? Perhaps the standard represents, therefore, an unelucidated compromise between the goals of section 1983 and the unfettered operation of state judiciaries. A legal standard that exposes
state courts to easy and repeated injunctive interference threatens
local judicial independence. But if principles of federal jurisdiction
prohibit both equitable and legal claims against judicial process, a
major segment of section 1983's mission has been lost. The "patently violative" standard, then, can be seen as an effort to temper
the original designs of the Civil Rights Act with the concessions to
necessity. If injunctive relief against state courts is available under
section 1983, but only in cases of clear and obvious mistake, the
constitutional oversight envisioned by the statute's framers is at
least partially saved without crippling local adjudicators. 219
means that "the prosecution has been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction." Harassment has been read to require "a series of repeated prosecutions." Robinson v. Stovall, 473 F. Supp. 135, 145-46 (N. D. Miss. 1979) (quoting Younger,
401 U.S. at 49), rev'd in part on other grounds, 646 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1981). In operation,
however, the exception has proven extremely difficult to meet. See, e.g., United Books, Inc.
v. Conte, 739 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (six obscenity prosecutions in two years insufficient). A
commentator in 1979 reported that the exception "has never been successfully invoked."
Comment, Limiting the Younger Doctrine: A Critique and Proposal, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1318,
1329 (1979). But see, for example, Tolbert v. City of Memphis, 568 F. Supp. 1285, 1288-89
(W.D. Tenn. 1983) (finding evidence of harassment). Justice Brennan argued in 1977 that
the Younger exceptions required showings that were "probably impossible to make." Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 498
(1977).
••• I have characterized the use of a "meaningful" patently unconstitutional standard as
federal oversight of state judicial process. At present, the Younger doctrine bars federal
interference with pending state actions. A patently unconstitutional pending state prosecution, under the regime I advocate, would be subject to injunctive interference by a federal
tribunal under § 1983. Of course a state court may, or may not, have actually been
presented with the federal constitutional claim in a pending state case. Because the exception I describe is designed to rectify the clear mistake, a requirement that the federal plain-
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This, however, is hardly the way the "patently violative" standard has been implemented. The Supreme Court's view of the exception is so rigid that it has never been deemed satisfied.220 Trainor v. Hernandez 221 presented the Court with a viable opportunity
to explore the standard, and the results were not encouraging. The
trial judge had found the state attachment provision challenged in
Trainor to be "patently violative of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."222 The Supreme Court overturned the
conclusion, maintaining (somewhat surprisingly given the language
of the trial opinion) that "even if such a finding was made below,
which we doubt, . . . it would not have been warranted in light of
our cases."223 Trainor's curt treatment of the exception has led
commentators to conclude, not unreasonably, that it "has become
meaningless. " 224
Under the reading of section 1983 that I propose, the Supreme
Court's effective interment of the Younger exceptions is unfortunate, and wrong. It is true, of course, that if Younger's stated rationale is dispositive, the exclusions are misguided from the outset.2211 But "Our Federalism," whatever its content, cannot be
defined without reference to the demands of section 1983. If the
Younger exceptions are in fact not that, but mere illusory components of an absolute bar to injunctive intervention, then, at a minimum, Mitchum has been buried. 226 A central tenet of the Civil
tiff have actually presented the constitutional claim in the pending state trial would be
called for. I would reject, however, the requirement announced in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592 (1975), that a federal litigant, under Younger principles, "must exhaust his
state appellate remedies before seeking relief in District Court." Id. at 608.
••• See Comment, supra note 218, at 1329.
221
431 u.s. 434 (1977).
.
••• Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757, 762 (N. D. Ill. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Trainor
v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
••• Trainor, 431 U.S. at 447.
••• See Laycock, supra note 214, at 198; see also Soifer & Macgill, supra note 22, at 1210
(addressing Trainor's refusal to make a substantive acknowledgement of the exception); 17
C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4255, at 583-84 (1978)
(the "universe" of exceptions "that can be established is virtually empty.").
••• See Comment, supra note 218, at 1329 (1979) ("exception[s] seem[ ] inconsistent with
the principles underlying equitable restraint").
••• I realize, of course, that Younger bas not expressly been construed to extend to all
civil cases, thus leaving some potential room for Mitchum to survive. The civil-criminal
distinction, however, is not a compelling one given the premises of the doctrine. Nor, ultimately, do I think it is long for this world. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct.
1519, 1526 (1987); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979).
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Rights Act of 1871-that the actions of state jurists are federally
cognizable-is lost as well.
A handful of federal trial courts have treated the exception in a
meaningful way. In one case, for example, the court found that a
statute clearly violating the first amendment and recently upheld
by the highest court of the state "appear[ed] to be patently unconstitutional," thus excusing the rigors of Younger. 227 In another, the
district judge determined that a pending state action presented
dangers of an "appalling infringement of the rights of free speech
and free exercise of religion," 228 and thus concluded that the
Younger doctrine "must give way."229 Such an approach secures a
core of federal supervision so that the intentions of the Civil
Rights Act are given at least some vitality. And unlike an open
balance of federal and state interests,230 a "patent" unconstitutionality standard leaves state judiciaries a broad range of unencumbered operation. With the implementation of meaningful exception, therefore, Younger itself can be justified as an effort to bend
the intentions of section 1983 to accommodate modern necessity.
Allen v. McCurry is a harder case. As an interpretation of section 1983, the opinion is simply wrong. Justice Stewart concluded
that "nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983
proves any congressional intent to deny binding effect to a state
court judgment."231 "[P]roves," of course, is the operative word. It
is literally true that the framers never mentioned collateral estoppel in express terms. Given the restrictive state of the doctrine in
1871, it would have been unnecessary for them to have considered
the question had they desired to do so. 232 But the demand for such
proof is hardly a fair way to read the intention of section 1983. The
Tolbert v. City of Memphis, 568 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (W.D. Tenn. 1983).
New Jersey-Philadelphia Presbytery v. New Jersey State Bd. of Higher Educ., 482 F.
Supp. 968, 976 (D.N.J. 1980).
210 ld. at 978.
230
See, for example, Redish, supra note 216, at 486-87 (advocating case-by-case balance
weighing (1) potential for disruption of state court process, (2) familiarity of issue to state
tribunals, and (3) reviewability of the claim on habeas corpus). Of course, such a standard
would greatly increase the call for federal supervision. First, the balance would be more
easily swayed in favor of federal intervention than would a patently unconstitutional standard. Second, even if ultimately unsuccessful under the balancing approach, a far greater
number of litigants would be encouraged to seek federal review as the result of the openended inquiry demanded.
231
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980) (emphasis added).
232
See Currie, supra note 28, at 329.
227
228
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Civil Rights Act of 1871 was rooted in distrust for state officials,
including state judges. If the McCurry Court had asked simply,
"Would the drafters of section 1983 have foreclosed federal consideration of any issues that were presented, or could have been
presented, in a prior state trial?," the legislative history reveals
that the response would have been an unequivocal "no."233
But the Supreme Court has now apparently followed Professor
Currie's lead and ruled that preclusion, even in section 1983 cases,
is demanded by the Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1738.234 That conclusion may be the correct one, though it
seems a strange way to treat a federal caur;;e of action that was
designed, at least in part, to operate against state tribunals. It
would also appear that the analysis of legislative history that rendered section 1983 an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act would
go a long way toward a determination that the Civil Rights Act is
not bound by the normal dictates of section 1738. Still, the question is hardly an easy one. It should be added, though, that when
this decision is added to Younger and Pierson, the result is striking. If Younger completely bars injunctive oversight of pending
claims, Pierson obviates damage actions, and principles of collateral estoppel prevent even subsequent equitable or declaratory reSee, e.g., the remarks of Senator Osborn:
The question now is, what and where is the remedy? I believe the true remedy lies
chiefly in the United States district and circuit courts. If the State courts had proven
themselves competent to suppress the local disorders, or to maintain law and order,
we should not have been called upon to legislate . . . at all. But they have not done
so. We are driven by existing facts to provide for the several States in the South what
they have heen unable fully to provide for themselves; i.e., the full and complete administration of justice in the courts. And the courts ... must be ... the United
States courts.
42 Globe, supra note 31, at 653.
It seems to me unlikely that Senator Osborn actually meant to provide a federal forum,
unless precluded by local rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
234
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) provides in part: "Such acts, records and judicial proceedings
... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ..• as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which
they are taken." See Currie, supra note 28, at 325-32 (advocating application of preclusion
via§ 1738 in§ 1983 actions). Allen v. McCurry's embrace of§ 1738 was tenuous. See McCurry, 449 U.S. at 95-99 (discussing a "background" of common law and§ 1738 preclusion).
More recently, however, in a§ 1983 case the Court indicated that "[i]t is now settled that a
federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be
given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered," and
cited§ 1738. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).
233
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view of state judicial process, the sweep is clean. A cause of action
that was designed in no small measure to ensure state judicial accountability essentially has no applicability to state courts. If section 1738 does demand preclusion in section 1983 cases, therefore,
the call for a meaningful exception to the Younger principle is
heightened, rather than diminished.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The body of judicial decisions outlining the relationship between
the section 1983 cause of action and state judicial process is a
troubled one. Our highest Court has done a poor job of handling
the tensions resulting from the application of a seemingly intrusive
statutory claim to local tribunals traditionally enjoying independence from federal trial court supervision. Rather than openly confronting and attempting to accommodate the disparity between the
language and design of section 1983 and the present demands of
state judicial process, opinions have employed two diametrically
opposed visions of the legislative history of the statute to accomplish either deference, or intervention, as the Justices have thought
appropriate. Clearly, there are better ways to decide cases. And the
inconsistent uses of legislative intention have led, not surprisingly,
to claims that one aspect or another of the Court's jurisdictional
doctrine is either incorrect, illegitimate, or both.
This essay has suggested that the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 reveals that the framers of the statute were far
more concerned with achieving constitutional compliance than
with respecting traditional notions of state sovereignty. As a result,
they fashioned a highly interventionist cause of action that was
designed, in no small measure, to assure the constitutional accountability of state courts. It is very unlikely, therefore, that they
would have supported the recognition of the various immunities
and shields from national intervention that litter the law of federal
courts.
Still, the legislative design of section 1983 does not resolve all of
our problems. The dramatic expansion in recent decades of the
"rights, privileges, [and] immunities· secured by the Constitution
and laws" of the United States has made it impossible to implement a fully intrusive section 1983 cause of action without doing
substantial damage to the independence and operation of the state
courts. Accordingly, I have suggested a method of interpreting the
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demands of section 1983 as it applies to state judiciaries that
repects the aims of the provision without debilitating local decisionmaking. Under the analysis suggested here, the bulk of the decision outlining the relationship between the section 1983 claim
and state judicial actors, with some modifications, can be justified.
Those determinations would constitute a more coherent jurisprudence, however, if they would directly explore the aims of the Civil
Rights Act and the impact that the implementation of those aims
will have on the legitimate demands of state court process.

